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ABSTRACT 
 
TESTING BACKWARD LINKAGES OF FDI IN CHINA 
 
by 
 
LIU ZHUOMIN 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Inward FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) affects productivity of local industries through 
three channels- direct effects, horizontal spillovers, and vertical linkages. This study 
focuses on the backward linkages of FDI in the 28 two-digit manufacturing sectors in 
China, as well as their horizontal and forward linkage effects. Two related tests, firm level 
pooled data test 1999-2002 and industrial level panel data test 1994-2003 are conducted to 
investigate whether backward linkages from multinational buyers brings productivity gain 
to local suppliers. Firm level tests provide convincing evidence that increase backward 
linkage of FDI will lead to productivity gains. This includes not only total factor 
productivity, but also labor productivity. Industry level tests, when conducted with and 
without time dummy variables, give different results: estimations with time dummy 
variables give little or sometimes negative results on the coefficients of backward linkage, 
while those without time dummy variables give positive and significant findings. Our 
estimation results also suggest positive effects of horizontal spillovers for both tests. 
Forward linkage is found to be negative in general. In sum, among the three spillover 
channels, backward linkage and horizontal spillovers are found to be beneficial to local 
industries, which is consistent with previous studies and the Chinese government’s 
incentives to attract more foreign direct investment.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
There exists a long tradition in development economics that takes an optimistic view of 
the effect that foreign direct investment (FDI) has on industrial development of the host 
country. In this tradition, multinationals are seen as agents that increase competition in the 
host economy, transfer modern technology, and help achieve a more efficient allocation 
of resources. Furthermore, it is argued that inward FDI pushes forward the process of 
industrial development by creating linkages with, or spillovers to, the rest of the 
economy.1 In pursuit of such benefits, China, for instance, adopted several favorable 
policies to attract foreign firms and foster relationships between multinationals and local 
firms. These preferential treatments include the freedom to import inputs, the right to 
retain and swap foreign exchange with each other and simpler licensing procedures. To 
enhance the transfer of technology, additional tax benefits are offered to those employing 
advanced technology.  
 
However, theoretical and empirical literature has argued that not all kinds of spillovers 
from FDI are equally beneficial to host industry productivity. When we look into the 
nature of FDI externalities, we find that potential spillovers effects of FDI to the host 
country can be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal spillovers refer to the technology leakage 
from multinationals to local firms in the same industry. The effects of spillovers can be 
two-fold: Such spillovers may provide positive externalities through a number of channels. 
First, local firms may be able to learn by observing and imitating foreign technology. 
Second, employees may leave multinationals to join local firms, bringing along new 
technology and management know-how. Third, multinational may provide public goods 
which can also be enjoyed by domestic firms. On the other hand, entry of multinationals 
may hurt local firm. First, foreign firms may hire talent away from local firms, thereby 
creating a “brain drain” (Blalock 2001). Second, foreign firms may raise wages for all firms 
 
1 The concept of linkages is due to Hirschmann (1958). See Moran (1998 and 2001) for recent comprehensive surveys of 
the effects of FDI on economic development of host countries. 
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in competitive labor (Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey 1996). Finally, entry of multinationals 
can grab market shares of domestic firms, generating competition effects.  
 
There has been a large literature which tries to measure the spillovers effects of FDI on 
the host economy. However, most of the recent studies found negative, rather than 
positive, horizontal spillovers effects from FDI. For instance, Kokko et al (1996), Aitken 
and Harrison (1999), Djankow and Hoekman (2000) and several others using firm level 
data find negative or insignificant evidence of horizontal spillovers. The explanation for 
little or even negative horizontal spillover effect is, as Blalock (2001) writes, “when one 
considers the incentive of foreign firms and the nature of markets they enter, however, it 
is not surprising that evidence of technology spillovers is weak at best. Multinationals will 
attempt to minimize technology leakage to competitors by limiting the mechanisms, such 
as labor mobility and imitation, through which spillover occur. Further, multinationals 
with non- protectable technology will likely choose not to enter overseas markets at all. 
Even if local firms can observe the technology brought with FDI, they may lack the 
absorptive capacity to adopt it because of the often wide gap in human capital and 
product development capabilities between multinational and local firms.” 
 
On the other hand, regarding vertical linkages, theoretical and empirical work shows the 
effects are more likely to be positive in nature because they confer private benefits to 
multinationals buyers. In particular, multinationals might want to transfer technology to 
their local suppliers, in order to enjoy lower production costs, increased specialization and 
better adaptation of technologies and products to local environments. Thus, 
multinationals may help their local suppliers in improving technology, staff training, 
quality control, and inventory management (World Investment Report 2001: Promoting 
Linkages). Backward linkages from FDI are beneficial to local suppliers in forms of 
increased output and employment, improved production efficiency, technological, 
managerial capabilities and market diversification. Similarly, domestic firms may become 
more productive as a result of gaining access to new, improved, or less costly intermediate 
inputs produced by multinationals in upstream sectors, that is, through forward linkage 
channels. Sales of these inputs by multinationals may also be accompanied by provision of 
complementary services.  
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However, the effects of backward linkages are not attended until recent papers by Blalock 
(2001) on Indonesia and Smarzynska (2002) on Lithuania. The testing of backward 
linkages from FDI in China, one of the largest FDI recipients among developing 
countries, is not currently available to the best of our knowledge. This paper, thus, 
partially serves to fill in such gap. In this paper we extend the recent empirical literature on 
backward linkages effects of FDI, by studying the case of China. Following the 
approaches of Blalock (2001) and Javorcik (2004) and using an industry level dataset 
(1994-2003), as well as a firm level dataset (1999-2002), we find evidence of positive 
backward linkages effects of FDI on both total factor productivity (TFP) and labor 
productivity in Chinese manufacturing industries. This is true under cluster tests of firm 
level data and industry tests when time dummy variables are eliminated. Overall, the 
results suggest that linkages with multinational clients bring about technology and human 
capital upgrading to upstream industry in China.  
This paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the recent literature on FDI spillovers 
and linkages, including case studies, theoretical work and empirical investigations. 
Although the findings on horizontal spillover effects are ambiguous, the evidence on 
backward linkages is convincingly positive for most literatures. Chapter 3 reviews China’s 
industry (mainly manufacturing) structure and FDI policies. In this chapter, we take a look 
at the contributions of industrial sectors to economic development in China, how 
ownership structure evolves over time since China’s opening up, and finally, how China’s 
FDI policies have undergone several changes from gradually and limited opening to active 
linking to domestic industry interests. Chapter 4 contains some discussions on the 
incentives why foreign firms in host country want to transfer technology to suppliers 
through backward linkages, channels of backward linkages, and positive and negative sides 
of backward linkages. It also provides several examples of how local firms benefit from 
linking up to multinational clients in different places around the world, followed by 
discussions of the theoretical base of why it is meaningful to test backward linkages of 
FDI in China by adopting Javorcik (2004)’s model to test backward linkage (local sourcing) 
ratio on total factor productivity (TFP).  
Chapter 5 presents the key findings. In this chapter, we test whether backward linkages 
from FDI bring productivity gains to upstream local suppliers in China. In our model, we 
regress value added on capital and labor (to capture the total factor productivity), together 
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with backward linkage, forward linkage and horizontal FDI ratios. The key variable of our 
interest, backward linkage ratio, is defined as the share of an industry’s output purchased 
by downstream foreign funded enterprises in the host country. We use both the data from 
China’s statistical yearbooks and Input-output Tables of 1992 & 1997 (the latest version 
2003 is not yet published) to calculate the ratios for each of the 28 manufacturing sectors 
in China. We performed types of two tests: robust cluster test on firm level pooled data 
(1999~2002), and industry test- pooled, random effect and fixed effect models on 
industry panel dataset (1994~2003). In our firm level analysis, we use the same approach 
as in Blalock (2001) and Javorcik (2004) by regressing firm level productivity on sectoral 
backward linkage ratios, but utilize robust cluster test to adjust for the upward bias of t 
statistics when using aggregate variables on micro units. Firm level tests provide 
convincing evidence that increase backward linkage of FDI will lead to productivity raise. 
This includes not only total factor productivity, but also labor productivity. Industry tests, 
when tested with and without time dummy variables, give different results: estimations 
with time dummy variables give little or sometimes negative results on the coefficients of 
backward linkage, while those without time dummy variables give positive and significant 
findings. Our estimation results also suggest positive effects of horizontal spillovers for 
both tests. Forward linkage is found to be negative in general. In sum, among the three 
spillover channels, backward linkage and horizontal spillovers are found to be beneficial 
to local industries, which is consistent with previous literatures and the Chinese 
government’s incentives to attract more foreign direct investment.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses research limitations, including data limitations and methodology 
limitations. Chapter 7 concludes and suggests some ways to enhance the magnitude of 
backward linkages of FDI in China. These ways include self-technology upgrading to 
increase multinationals’ incentives to source locally, organizing special programs to 
connect local and multinationals firms, and allowing multinationals to choose promising 
suppliers and provide them assistance.  
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C h a p t e r  2  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The existing literature on spillovers and linkages is of three kinds: case studies, theoretical 
work and empirical investigation. We review each type accordingly in the remaining 
chapter, focusing on empirical studies. 
2.1 Case Studies 
Case studies present mixed evidence on the role of foreign investment in generating 
technology transfer to domestic firms. One case study in Mauritius and Bangladesh 
suggests that the entry of several foreign firms led to the creation of a booming, 
domestically owned export industry for textiles (Rhee and Belot 1989). Mansfield and 
Rorneo (1980), however, found that only a few on the 15 multinationals in their survey 
helped domestic firms acquire new technology. In a study of 65 subsidiaries in 12 
developing countries, Germidis (1977) found almost no evidence of technology transfer 
to local competitors. Moran (1998) notes that the performance of the Mexican auto parts 
industry was improved due to the readiness of multinationals to invest in high- quality 
vertical relationships. Given such ambiguous findings on FDI spillovers, researchers start 
to investigate the impact of FDI on local welfare theoretically and empirically.    
2.2 Theoretical Work 
The pioneering work concerning backward linkages is by Hirschmann, the first to raise 
that FDI may benefit developing countries by transfer of technology through backward 
linkages. Later, Rodriguez-Clare (1996), the main concept of which is that backward 
linkages bring a greater variety of specialized input, thus generating a positive externality 
to other final-good producers, uses a two-country model- one headquarter (developed 
country) and the other FDI recipient (developing country), and shows that entry of 
multinationals may or may not benefit host countries, depending on the sophistication or 
large variety of intermediate goods. Markusen and Venables (1999) note that the entry of 
multinationals can have profound effects on local firms: competition in the product and 
  6
factor markets tends to reduce profits of local firms, but linkage effects to supplier 
industries may create demand for local suppliers and improve their quality, productivity 
and product diversity. They also show that FDI may lead to the establishment of local 
industrial sectors, and act as a catalyst leading to the development of local industry which 
may in turn become so strong the reduce both the relative and absolute position of 
multinationals in the industry. The heart of these two models is “love-of-variety 
production function” proposed by Ethier (1982).  
These two analytical papers emphasize on the demand side effects of multinationals’ entry. 
Pack and Saggi (2001) focuses on the benefits of both importer in the developed country 
and suppliers in the less developed country. It shows that, although distributing the 
technology widely to multiple suppliers would encourage entry (competition), if new 
competition is not too great, the benefits of a competitive supply base to the multinational 
buyer outweigh the rents lost of free-loading rivals. Following Pack and Saggi (2001), Lin 
and Saggi (2003) develops a two-tier oligopoly model in which the entry of a multinational 
firm results in technology transfer to its local suppliers and the impact of backward 
linkages on the local industry. It also focuses on multinational’s decision on exclusivity 
and how invited suppliers respond, suggesting exclusivity may cause suppliers’ output to 
shrink.  
It is also natural to relate backward linkages with local content requirements (LCR) policy. 
As is general believed, LCRs enhance the magnitude of backward linkages. Hence, the 
governments of the developing countries have incentives to set up optimal LCR policies 
to attract and benefit from FDI. Qiu and Tao (2001) explore various aspects of LCP 
policies by assuming a two-multinational-firm (one more cost-efficient than the other) 
model and show that properly set LCP policy induces both firms to undertake FDI. 
Under discriminatory LCR, if employment is the main source of FDI benefit, then the 
optimal LCR for the more cost-efficient firm is lower.  The opposite is true when the 
government concerns most about technological upgrading. Under uniform LCR, a less 
efficient firm is more likely to adopt the FDI most than a more efficient firm.  
On the other hand, Moran (2002) criticized the role of LCR on technology transfer. 
According this paper, the foreign affiliates may not achieve full economics, not utilize the 
most advanced production techniques when they have to integrate or cooperate with local 
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firms whose technology is not only older but different from what is found is world class 
production sites, pointing out that technological sophistication is the key factor to capture 
backward linkages.  
2.3 Empirical Studies 
Concerning empirical studies, Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003) provided a thorough 
review of recent literature regarding horizontal and vertical spillovers. According to their 
point of view, the empirical investigation on spillovers and linkages can be divided into 
three generations. The first generation is characterized by using industry-level or cross-
sectional studies to test for horizontal spillovers from FDI. These studies generally found 
a positive correlation between foreign presence and sectoral productivity. For instance, 
the pioneering work of Caves (1974) finds positive FDI spillovers in Australia. Blomstrom 
(1983) and Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) find positive effects for Mexico, and Sjohoimn 
(1999) for Indonesia. Cross-sectional empirical work by Borensztein, De Gregorio and 
Lee (1998), Carkovic and Levine (2000) and Alfaro, Chandra, Kalemli- Ozcan and Sayek 
(2003) finds little support that FDI has an positive effect on economic growth. However, 
their evidence suggests that local conditions such as education level and the development 
of local financial markets play an important role in allowing the positive effects of FDI to 
materialize. Carkovic and Levine (2002) also cast doubt on the findings on growth and 
FDI. When accounting for simultaneity bias and country-specific effects, they find that 
the exogenous component of FDI does not exert a robust positive influence on growth.  
However, a widely cited paper by Aitken and Harrison (1999), which is considered as the 
starting point of the second generation of empirical studies, first raises the question of 
“selection bias” when using industrial data in measuring foreign presence on sectoral 
productivity. In their paper, using firm level panel data on Venezuelan plants, they find 
that spillovers from within sector joint ventures negative affected the productivity of 
domestically owned plants. Although they do find positive evidence of foreign-equity 
participation on plant productivity (direct effect of FDI) for small enterprises with less 
than 50 employees, the net impact, as they argue, taking into these two offsetting effects, 
is quite small. The gains from FDI appear to be entirely captured by joint ventures. Such 
finding of large, negative spillovers from foreign investment to domestic firms is in sharp 
contrast with previous studies. The reason, as they noted, is that using data aggregated at 
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the sectoral level, these studies were unable to control for differences in productivity 
across sectors which might be correlated with, but not caused by, foreign presence. 
Foreign firms may be located in high productivity industries as opposed to causing 
productivity externalities. Furthermore, high growth countries may attract more FDI as 
opposed to FDI causing this high growth. In such case, the coefficients on industrial level 
estimates are likely to overstate the positive impact of foreign investment. As a result, one 
could find evidence of positive foreign presence on industrial productivity, but not 
necessarily indicating horizontal externalities.  
Following Aitken and Harrison (1999), Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech 
Republic, and Kongings (2001) on Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, also find little or 
negative evidence of spillovers from FDI in developing countries. On the other hand, the 
case seems to be different in industrialized countries, as recent work by Haskel et al. (2002) 
and Keller and Yeaple (2003) provide evidence of positive FDI spillovers in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Such differences, as Kongings (2001) says, 
are reasonable because a number of recent theoretical and empirical papers show that the 
degree to which domestic firms may benefit from such spillovers depends on the 
absorptive capacity of domestic firms. This is more likely achieved in sectors characterized 
by intensive R&D by firms which have a sufficient amount of knowledge to start with. 
Later, Grog and Greenway’s (2002) survey of studies using panel dataset finds that only 
the two studies for industrialized countries mentioned above and none for developing 
countries report positive evidence for within industry externalities, and conclude that the 
effects are mostly negative.  
Nevertheless, there are not many empirical papers on FDI spillovers in China. Cheung 
and Lin (2003) using provincial data from 1995 to 2000 find positive effects of FDI on 
innovations (the number of patent application) in China. They also find that the effects 
are strongest for minor innovations such as external design patent, highlighting a 
“demonstration effect” of FDI. Hu and Jefferson (2001, 2002) use data for large-and 
medium-size enterprises to examine the spillover effects of FDI in manufacturing 
industries in China. They found that inward FDI has a positive effect on introduction of 
new products in China. 
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Given these findings, economists recently turned to examining vertical spillovers effects 
of FDI. Especially after a report by UNCTAD (2001) “Promoting Linkages” discussing 
the benefits of backward linkages from FDI to domestic suppliers, a new group a papers- 
the third generation papers as classified by Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003)- has 
explored the existence of positive externalities from FDI towards local firms in upstream 
industries. Here the findings are more encouraging. A rare large sample empirical study is 
by Kugler (2000), which shows that FDI in one sector of Colombian manufacturing can 
cause productivity gains in another. Kugler, however, does not identify backward linkages 
or any particular causal mechanisms for the inter-sector spillover (Blalock and Gertler 
2004).  Blalock (2001) filled this gap in the literature by defining horizontal FDI as the 
proportion of output produced by foreign firms in each sector 
∑∑= i ijti ijtijtjt outputoutputFDIhorizontal /)*( , and backward linkage as the share of an 
industry’s output purchased by downstream foreign funded enterprises in the host 
country ∑=
 
_*_
k
krtjktjrt FDIhorizontalFDIVertical α , Then in his latest revised 
version, Blalock and Gertler (2004) use a panel dataset of Indonesian manufacturing 
establishments from 1988 to 1996 to test whether the productivity of firms a sectors in a 
particular market increased when the share of their output sold to foreign- owned firms 
increased, and find strong evidence of productivity gains, greater competition, and lower 
prices amongst local firms upstream from foreign entrants. Javorcik (2004) conducts 
similar test on a panel firm level dataset on Lithuanian manufacturing sectors over the 
period 1996-2000 and also finds for backward linkages. However, she modified the 
measurement for backward linkages ratio by deleting inputs supplied within the 
sector ∑
≠
=
jkk
ktjkjt horizontalFDIBackward
 if 
*_ α , for she argued that this effect has 
been capture by horizontal FDI, and for the same principle defined forward linkages as 
the share of output in upstream sectors produced by firms with foreign capital 
participation (excluding exports). She also adjusts for the upward bias of t statistics caused 
by regressing firm level data on industry level backward linkages. Javorcik (2004) further 
tests on horizontal externalities and forward linkages and concludes that it is difficult to 
find robust evidence of positive externalities from multinationals to local firms in the 
same sector and to downstream buyers. A number of other studies focusing on vertical 
linkages provide mixed findings. Smarzynska and Spatareanu (2002) testing on data from 
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Romania find negative results of backward linkages, while Cordova (2003) finds that 
foreign capital improves total factor productivity (TFP), with positive inter-industry 
externalities prevailing over a negative intra-industry effect.  
The only empirical study of vertical linkages on China, to the best of our knowledge, 
comes from Kinoshita (1998). Using a sample firm data taken from a survey conducted by 
the World Bank in eight cities in China IN 1992, the author defined foreign linkages as 
answer “yes” to the question “Do you currently have foreign buyers or suppliers? (=1 if 
yes; =0 if no). Then samples are tested separately in terms of whether a firm has any 
foreign linkages or not. The paper finds the existence of “foreign joint venture” is 
effective in raising TFP growth is firms have foreign suppliers or buyers and concludes 
foreign joint ventures and foreign linkages are complements in increasing a firm’s 
productivity. However, as we know, FDI inflow started to boom after 1993, hence, a 
study using more recent data is needed.  
To summarize the major empirical findings, we list the recent evidence concerning FDI 
spillovers and linkages in table 1.  
Table 1. Overview of Evidence on Spillovers or Linkages from Foreign to Local firms in Developing 
Countries 
Author(s) Sample Results 
Cross-sectional
Blomstrom and 
Wolff (1994) 
Mexico, 1970 Higher foreign shares in industry in 1970 led to higher rates of 
productivity growth in locally owned firms over the next five 
years 
Kokko, Tansini and 
Zejan (1994) 
Uruguay, 1988  Positive spillovers from FDI to a sub-sample of locally-owned 
manufacturing plants with moderate technology gaps vis-à-vis 
foreign firms 
Sjoholm (1999) Indonesia, 1980-
1991 
Positive effects from FDI to locally -owned establishments 
SUR estimation
Borensztei, De 
Gregorio and Lee 
(1998) 
FDI flows to 69 
LDC, 1979; 1980-
1989 
FDI contributes to growth only when the host country has a 
minimum threshold stock of human capital 
Panel
Haddad and 
Harrison (1994) 
Morocco, 1985-
1989 
Reject the hypothesis that foreign presence accelerated 
productivity growth in domestic firms 
Aitken and 
Harrision (1999) 
Venezuela, 1976-
1989 
Small net impact of foreign investment. Positive effect of 
foreign equity participation on plant productivity robust only 
for small firms. Negative effect foreign investment on 
domestically owned plants 
Djankov and 
Hoekman (2000) 
Czech Republic, 
1992-1996 
Joint ventures and foreign direct investment have a negative 
spillover effects on firms that do not have foreign partnerships 
Panel-Olley-Pakes
Lopez- Cordova Mexico, 1993- Foreign capital improve TFP, positive inter-industry spillovers 
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(2003) 2000 from FDI prevail over a negative intra-industry effect 
Javorcik (2004) Lithuania, 1996-
2000 
No evidence of horizontal spillovers and some evidence of 
backward linkages 
Blalock and Gertler 
(2003) 
Indonesia, 1988-
1996 
Strong evidence for backward linkages 
GMM
Carkovic and 
Levine (2002) 
72 countries 1990-
1995, 5 year 
periods 
Exogenous components of FDI does not exert a robust, 
positive influence on economic growth 
Source: modified from Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003) 
One general implication drawn from the existing literature- case studies, empirical test or 
theoretical work, is that backward linkage serves as an important channel for developing 
countries to absorb advanced technology from international market. In the next chapters, 
we are to explore the impact of backward linkages in China, one of the largest FDI 
recipients among developing countries. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND FDI IN CHINA 
 
This chapter provides some background information on China’s industry structure and 
development, as well as China’s policies toward foreign direct investment.  
3.1. Industry Structure 
GDP in China has experienced fast development since China’s opening up to the world, 
growing rapidly from 362 (in 1978) to 11725 billion yuan in 2003 (figure 1). GDP per 
capita is also increasing over the years, from 379 (in 1978) to 9101 yuan per person in 
2003.  
Figure1. GDP (100 million yuan) 1978~2003 
GDP
0.0
20000.0
40000.0
60000.0
80000.0
100000.0
120000.0
140000.0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
year
10
0 
m
ill
io
n 
yu
an
GDP
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1979~2004 
Among all the sectors, industries contribute most to this fast economic growth. From 
1979 to 1999, the average growth rate of industrial value added is 11.7%, significantly 
higher than other sectors, i.e. primary and tertiary sectors. From table 2, we learn that 
value added growth of industrial sectors has always been an important component of 
economic growth. If we divide the year 1979 to 1999 into 6 periods, we find that the fast 
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growth periods are period 84~88, 92~94 and 95~97, which follows a similar pattern to 
GDP growth (Zhou and Guo (2000). 
Table 2. Change of industry growth rate in comparison with other sectors 
Average Annual Growth of Value Added (%) 
year Industry Construction Primary Tertiary GDP 
1979~1983 7.6 10.4 6.2 10.4 8.1 
1984~1988 14.2 14.8 5.0 15.4 12.0 
1989~1991 7.5 0.5 4.2 5.5 5.7 
1992~1994 20.1 17.5 4.5 10.9 13.5 
1995~1997 12.6 7.8 4.5 8.5 9.6 
1998~1999 8.7 8.1 3.1 7.5 7.4 
       
1979~1999 11.7 10.3 4.9 10.4 9.6 
Source: Zhou and Guo (2000) 
Since China opened up to foreign direct investment in early 90s, the industry structure 
has also changed tremendously over the time: state owned and collective owned 
enterprises have gradually lost their leading roles in the market in terms of decreasing 
number share, market share, value added and fixed capital share (table 3a, b, c and d)2. 
On the other hand, the number of foreign funded enterprises has increased from 8434 
in 1992 to 17429 in 2003, growing by more than twice. The market share and capital 
share have also doubled or tripled their sizes in ten years’ time.  For instance, in 1993, 
the year FDI inflow started to boom, the output of foreign funded enterprises and 
those with funds from greater China areas (GCAs) including Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Macau together accounted for 9% of industry total, while in 2003, the output of these 
two types accounts for 31% of industry total output, far dominating collective owned 
and being close to state owned enterprises.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Please note that there is a change of standard for data reporting in year 1998, and that’s why we observe a sudden jump 
for all the ratios concerning 1998, but the same pattern follows afterwards.  
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Table 3a. Number share of industrial enterprises by ownership 
Year State Owned 
Collective 
Owned 
Share-Holding 
Corporation 
Foreign 
Funded 
Enterprises 
with Funds 
from GCAs 
1992 0.18 0.79 0.03 
1993 0.18 0.76 0.01 0.02 0.03 
1994 0.17 0.74 0.01 0.03 0.04 
1995 0.17 0.71 0.01 0.03 0.05 
1996 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 
1997 0.16 0.68 0.03 0.04 0.05 
1998 0.39 0.29 0.02 0.06 0.10 
1999 0.38 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.10 
2000 0.33 0.23 0.03 0.07 0.10 
2001 0.27 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.11 
2002 0.23 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.11 
2003 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.11 
 
Table 3b. Output share of industrial enterprises by ownership 
Year State Owned 
Collective 
Owned 
Share-Holding 
Corporation 
Foreign 
Funded 
Enterprises 
with Funds 
from GCAs 
1992 0.62 0.29 0.09 
1993 0.56 0.30 0.04 0.05 0.04 
1994 0.49 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.06 
1995 0.47 0.29 0.05 0.09 0.09 
1996 0.43 0.30 0.05 0.10 0.09 
1997 0.41 0.29 0.07 0.12 0.09 
1998 0.50 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.12 
1999 0.49 0.17 0.07 0.14 0.12 
2000 0.47 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.12 
2001 0.44 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.12 
2002 0.41 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.12 
2003 0.38 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.12 
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Table 3c. Value added share of industrial enterprises by ownership 
Year State Owned 
Collective 
Owned 
Share-Holding 
Corporation 
Foreign 
Funded 
Enterprises 
with Funds 
from GCAs 
1992 0.68 0.25 0.07 
1993 0.57 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.04 
1994 0.54 0.28 0.06 0.06 0.05 
1995 0.54 0.25 0.05 0.08 0.07 
1996 0.48 0.29 0.05 0.09 0.07 
1997 0.46 0.26 0.07 0.10 0.08 
1998 0.57 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.11 
1999 0.56 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.11 
2000 0.54 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.11 
2001 0.52 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.11 
2002 0.48 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.11 
2003 0.45 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.11 
 
Table 3d. Fixed Investment Share of industrial enterprises by ownership 
Year State Owned 
Collective 
Owned 
Share-Holding 
Corporation 
Foreign 
Funded 
Enterprises 
with Funds 
from GCAs 
1992 0.78 0.16 0.06 
1993 0.72 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.04 
1994 0.65 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.05 
1995 0.64 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.08 
1996 0.64 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.08 
1997 0.62 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.08 
1998 0.72 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.09 
1999 0.72 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 
2000 0.71 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.09 
2001 0.70 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.09 
2002 0.67 0.04 0.15 0.12 0.09 
2003 0.64 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.09 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, multiple years 
Note: Before 1998, national total refers to enterprises with independent accounting system. Starting from 
1998, only enterprises with an annual sales income of over 5 million yuan are reported.  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) thus constitutes an important part of China’s industrial 
structure. More importantly, foreign enterprises are usually more efficient in production. 
Table 4 lists the comparison of labor productivity between overall and foreign funded 
enterprises.  
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Table 4. Comparison of average industrial labor productivity (1999~2003) between foreign and 
industrial average (yuan/person) 
Industries (1999~2003) 
Average 
Foreign 
Productivity 
Average 
Industry 
Productivity gap 
Food Processing                                 88777 58676 1.51 
Food Manufacturing                              84290 50657 1.66 
Beverage Manufacturing                          119516 70147 1.70 
Tobacco Processing                              206851 489607 0.42 
Textile Industry                                44273 29592 1.50 
Garments and Other Fiber Products               27901 28243 0.99 
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products        26853 30707 0.87 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane and Palm Fiber 43555 35957 1.21 
Furniture Manufacturing                         41051 37659 1.09 
Papermaking and Paper Products                  85803 43474 1.97 
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction         72506 44035 1.65 
Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods          24833 25662 0.97 
Petroleum Processing and Coking                 364398 150179 2.43 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products    145159 52629 2.76 
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products             135036 70655 1.91 
Chemical Fiber                                  126953 66182 1.92 
Rubber Products                                 57687 41639 1.39 
Plastic Products                                53045 45438 1.17 
Nonmetal Mineral Products                       59931 32152 1.86 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals         120506 67122 1.80 
Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals      94945 57159 1.66 
Metal Products                                  61570 43664 1.41 
Ordinary Machinery                              87645 37904 2.31 
Special Purpose Equipment                       81988 35802 2.29 
Transport Equipment                             170919 60456 2.83 
Electric Equipment and Machinery                71542 60271 1.19 
Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment     124494 100366 1.24 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery 57451 41525 1.38 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 2000~2004 
Table 4 shows the average labor productivity in foreign funded enterprises is significantly 
higher than industry average for most of the sectors. In the next section, we are going to 
explore the government’s policies in attracting FDI and enhance technology transfer to 
less-productive local industries.  
3.2 China’s FDI Policy 
Since the early 1990s, China has been the world’s largest FDI recipient among developing 
countries, accounting for over one fourth of total FDI inflow (table 5). Ever since the 
opening up of China to the outside world, the amount of FDI inflow to China has 
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increased dramatically from $3.38 billion (in nominal value) in 1980 to $56.14 billion in 
2002, with the peak at $64.408 billion in 1997 (figure 2).  
 
Table 5. FDI inflows to China: in comparison with other developing countries 
 
  
1998-93 
(average) 1997 1998 1999
            
FDI inflows (US billions)    
      
China  8.8 44.2 43.75 40.4
All developing countries 46.9 178.8 179.5 207.6
Average South Asia, East Asia and South East Asia 27.1 93.5 87.2 96.1
      
FDI/gross fixed capital formation (%)   
      
China  6.4 14.6 12.9 --
Average developing countries 4.6 10.8 11.5 --
Average South Asia, East Asia and South East Asia 5.5 9.8 10.5 --
Source: UNCTAD (2000b) 
Figure 2. Actual usage of foreign capital 1979~2003 
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1980~2004 
One of the key elements of China economic reform process has been the encouragement 
of foreign direct investment. Since 1970s, China has gradually opened its economy for 
foreign business. At the same time, China’s policies toward FDI have also experience 
various changes.  
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According to Fung, Iizaka and Tong (2002), in the late 1970s and early 1980s, government 
policies are characterized by setting new regulations to permit joint ventures using foreign 
capital and setting up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and “open cities”. At the second 
session of the fifth National People’s Congress in July 1979, The Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Joint Ventures using Chinese and Foreign Investment was adopted, granting foreign 
investment a legal status in China. The State Council also awarded rights of autonomy in 
foreign trade to Guangdong and Fujian provinces and in 1980, setting up four SEZs in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. In December 1982, the decision to open up 
China to the world economy was formally included in the 1982 State Constitution 
adopted by the Sixth National People’s Congress. Later in 1983, Regulations for the 
implementation of the law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment was formulated in 1983 to further liberalize the domestic market.  
In 1984, the concept of SEZs was extended to another fourteen coastal cities and Hainan 
Island. Twelve of the fourteen cities were designated Technology Promotion Zones in 
1985 to expedite the transfer of technology, indicating China has paid more attention to 
the technology transfer from foreign firms rather than just foreign capitals. In 1985, 
“development triangles”- the Yangtze River delta, the Pearl River delta in Guangdong, 
and the Min Nan region in Fujian, Liaodong and Shandong Peninsulas and the Bohai Sea 
Coastal Region-were also opened to foreign investors. In 1990, the Pudong district of 
Shanghai was designated as a new development zone. 
In 1986, more favorable regulations and provisions are used to encourage FDI inflow, 
especially export-oriented joint ventures and joint ventures using advanced technologies. 
Wholly foreign owned enterprises were also allowed. On October 11, 1986, the state 
Council promulgated the Provision of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment. These provisions provided foreign joint ventures with 
preferential treatment, the freedom to import input such as materials and equipment, the 
right to retain and swap foreign exchange with each other, and simpler licensing 
procedures. Additional tax benefits were offered to export-oriented joint ventures and 
those employing advanced technology. The importance of the 1986 provisions is that it 
provided incentives for FDI rather than merely permitting it.  
  19
China’s proactive policies toward FDI result in increasing inflow of foreign capital in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. From mid 1990s, while maintaining favorable environment for 
foreign business, government policies began to focus more on linking FDI promotion to 
domestic industrial objectives. For instance, the Provisional Guidelines for foreign Investment 
Projects took effect on June 27, 1995. Priority was given to FDI in the agriculture, energy, 
transportation, telecommunications, basic raw materials, and high-tech industries, and 
FDI projects which could take advantage of the rich natural resources and relatively low 
labor costs in the central and northwest regions were to be vigorously encouraged.  
Later, Guiding Catalogue of Foreign Investment Projects provided the basis for the examination 
and approval of FDI projects, which were to be classified to one of four categories: 
encouraged, restricted, prohibited and permitted. Included in the encouraged projects 
were those in infrastructure or underdeveloped agriculture; those with new/advanced 
technology which could upgrade product function, save energy and raw material, improve 
economic efficiency, or manufacture under supplied new equipment/material to satisfy 
market demand; those which were export-oriented; those which involved new 
technology/equipment which made use of natural/regenerative resources and 
prevented/controlled pollution and so on. Some projects were classified as restricted such 
as those whose technologies had been developed or transferred, and those were 
production exceeded domestic demand; and those under experiment or monopolized by 
the state, and those engaged in the exploration of rare and valuable mineral recourses. 
Prohibited are those that harmed public interest and national security damaged the 
environment, natural resources or human health. Those that are not in any the above 
groups are classified as “permitted”.  
Generally speaking, China’s policies toward FDI have experienced three stages: gradually 
and limited opening, active promoting, and promoting in accordance with domestic 
interest (Fung, Iizaka and Tong 2002). To conclude, perhaps the address by Planning 
Minister Zeng Peiyan best describes the current Chinese FDI policy, “…effects will be 
stepped up to attract investment from multinational corporations. Meanwhile, vigorous 
effects will be made to attract foreign investment in a variety of forms for the 
reorganization and technological upgrading of state-owned enterprises. We will attract 
foreign investment to fields encouraged by the government, such as high technology and 
environmental protection, as well as to the central and western regions. We need to 
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improve the management of foreign-funded enterprises, provide better service to them 
and protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors” (Xinhua News Agency 
March 16, 2000). 
3.3 Local Content Requirement 
 
A policy designed specifically to promote backward linkage effect of FDI is the so-called 
local content requirement, which requires a foreign investor to purchase a certain amount 
of intermediate input from local suppliers as opposed to from international markets. 
Under such requirement, the government regulates the names of related products, the 
number or the value of domestic products that multinational firms must purchase or 
utilize in the production of final goods.3 In China, The Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Chinese and Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (the ninth term), the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Chinese and Foreign Contractual Cooperative Enterprises 
(the nineteenth term), and the Law of the People’s Republic of China Enterprises with 
Foreign Capital (the fifteenth term) require that foreign invested (joint venture, wholly 
owned and those with foreign capital participation should source their intermediate locally 
in China, if possible.  
For instance, during the 1990s China required that the local content rate of all cars made 
in China be at least 40 percent and must increase to 60 percent in a year and to 80 percent 
in two years after operation of a project (China Daily July 15, 2004). In the mobile phone 
industry, to protect domestic mobile phone producers, China has banned new foreign 
investment in the mobile phone manufacturing industry. Besides, a quota system was 
introduced on the percentage of local content allowed for mobile phones made by 
foreign-invested manufacturers for export and local consumption. Existing foreign joint 
ventures must export at least 60% and by the end of year 2001 must reach a local content 
rate, by value, of at least 50% (Chinanetnews November 7, 2000).  
 
However, upon China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Chinese laws 
and policies have been amended. For instance, in terms of the operations of foreign 
investment, China has repealed the performance requirements that are prohibited by the 
 
3 See Qiu and Tao (2001) for an analysis of optimal design of local content requirement policy. 
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Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreement, such as the requirements for 
local content and the requirements of foreign exchanges. Thus, foreign-invested 
enterprises basically enjoy the same treatment as that of the domestic-invested enterprises. 
However, China is still at the stage of economic transformation and there is a certain gap 
between some measures requirements of the principles the market economy and the 
WTO rules. Relaxation of local content requirement and foreign exchange requirement 
implies that foreign invested firms in China will import more intermediate inputs from 
overseas in a more convenient way. Thus, the strategy for technology transfer through 
backward linkages will be less effective, and domestic market will face the pressures of 
foreign firms in terms of higher technology and lower price. Thus, as Wu Jinglian, one 
Chinese economist, pointed out, before challenges and the new rules, domestic enterprises 
have to actively upgrade their technology and management structure to enhance foreign 
firms’ incentives to source locally.  
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C h a p t e r  4  
MULTINATIONALS, BACKWARD LINKAGES AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER  
 
In this chapter, we discuss some possible benefits of backward linkages from FDI to local 
industries and the factors that may affect multinational’s decision to transfer technology to 
local suppliers. 
 
4.1 General Dissuasions 
 
With the growing importance of FDI in economic life, host countries seek not just more 
such investment, but are also increasingly interested in its quality, in terms of benefits for 
sustainable economic development. Perhaps the most important way to tap these benefits 
is through production linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. Such 
linkages can take several forms: backward, forward or horizontal. Backward linkages exist 
when foreign affiliates acquire goods or services to domestic firms. It is often argued that 
backward linkage is the most important conduit for technology transfer among the three 
because, although multinationals seek to minimize technology leakage to competitors, 
they have every incentive to improve the productivity of their suppliers through training, 
quality control, and inventory management. To reduce dependency on a single supplier, 
the multinational may establish such relationship with multiple vendors, which benefit 
firms which purchase these vendors’ output (Blalock and Gentlet 2004). Backward 
linkages are of significant importance to developing countries because domestic firms in 
developing countries are generally behind foreign firms as regards to technology, human 
resources and other competitiveness-related factors. Thus, integration with FDI places a 
host country industry along the frontier of best practices in the international industry 
(Romer 1994).    
 
As World Investment Report: Promoting Linkages (2001) indicates, backward linkages are 
important to both foreign affiliates and domestic enterprises. Starting with affiliates, most 
productive enterprises buy a large proportion of inputs from other firms. If foreign 
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affiliates can procure input locally, particularly in host economics in which labor costs are 
low, they can lower production costs (some service input, for example, may be very 
expensive to import). If they can subcontract directly to local suppliers, they can increase 
their specialization and flexibility, and adapt technologies and products better and faster to 
local conditions. Domestic suppliers can also benefit from linkages with foreign affiliates. 
First, linkages raise output and employment in linked suppliers. Linkages can be powerful 
channels for diffusing knowledge and skills, and exchanging information between firms. 
Under the right conditions, domestic firms may develop to become global suppliers. The 
strengthening of suppliers can in turn lead to various indirect effects and spillovers for the 
rest of the host economy.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Backward Linkages and Other Relationships between foreign affiliated and local 
enterprises and organizations 
 
Relationship of foreign affiliate to local enterprises  
Form Backward 
(sourcing) 
Forward 
(distribution) 
Horizontal 
Relationship of 
foreign affiliate to 
non-business 
institution 
“Pure” 
market 
transaction 
“Off-the shelf” 
purchases 
“Off-the shelf” 
sales 
  
Short-term 
linkage 
Once-for-all 
intermittent 
purchases 
Once-for-all 
intermittent sales 
  
Longer-term 
linkage 
a. Longer-term 
(contractual) 
arrangement for 
the procurement of 
inputs for further 
process 
b. Subcontracting 
of the production 
of final or 
intermediate 
products 
a. Longer-term 
(contractual) 
relationship with 
local distributor or 
end-customer 
b. Outsourcing 
from domestic 
firms to foreign 
affiliates 
Joint projects with 
competing domestic 
firms 
a. R&D contracts with 
local institutions such 
as universities and 
research centers 
b. Training programs 
for firms by 
universities 
c. Traineeships for 
students in firms 
Equity 
relationship 
a. Joint venture with 
supplier 
b. Establishment of 
new supplier-affiliate 
(by existing foreign 
affiliate) 
a. Joint venture 
with distributor or 
end-customer 
b. Establishment 
of new 
distribution 
affiliate (by 
existing foreign 
affiliate) 
a. Horizontal joint 
venture 
b. Establishment of 
new affiliate (by 
exiting foreign 
affiliate) for the 
production of same 
goods and services 
as it produces 
Joint public-private 
R&D centers/training 
centers/universities 
“Spillovers” a. Demonstration effects in unrelated firms  
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       -Spillover on process (technology) 
       -Spillover on product design 
       -Spillover on formal and tack skills 
b. Effects due to mobility of trained human resources 
c. Enterprise spin-offs 
d. Competition effects 
Source: World Investment Report: Promoting Linkage 2001 
Note: The cell in bold letters is the focus of our research 
 
However, not all linkages are equally beneficial for a host economy. For instance, as noted 
by World Investment Report: Promoting Linkages (2001), firms may strike considerable linkages 
in protected industries in which there are inadequate incentive to invest in technological 
capabilities. Linkages may also involve excessive costs for a host economy. The reason lies 
in the size and market power of foreign affiliates. Exclusive linkages with large, 
monopolistic foreign affiliate can lead to anti-competitive practices and unfair terms and 
conditions for suppliers (Altenburg 2000). The distributing of benefits between buyers 
and sellers is subject to bargaining, much depending on the technological content of 
suppliers. Suppliers of high value-added and sophisticates products are generally better 
placed to benefit from linkages than those selling simple products, for the former have 
greater scope for enhancing their technological and organizational capabilities via linkages. 
Suppliers of simple price-sensitive inputs may, in addition, have to compete with each 
other by cutting costs, making it difficult to raise revenues and pay higher wages. Where 
affiliates are “footloose” and prone to shift to lower cost locations as wages rise, local 
suppliers may again be forced to bear a high risk. The risk comes from suppliers “locked 
in” to large buyers and their fortunes tied to those of their main customers (World 
Investment Report: Promoting Linkages 2001). 
 
In sum, the impacts of backward linkages from FDI to developing host countries are two 
folded: They provide opportunities for production and employment by domestic suppliers. 
They constitute a direct channel for knowledge diffusion in upgrading domestic suppliers. 
However, the ability of multinationals’ linkages depends on the markets in which they 
operate and their incentives to do so. It also depends on the capabilities of domestic firms 
to learn.  
 
4.2 Evidence of Backward Linkages around the World 
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Eng Teknologi Holdings Bhd (ENGTEK), headquartered in Penang, Malaysia, is a global 
supplier for the computer hard disk drive industries. This holding has nine companies in 
four countries (China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand). Some 2000 employees 
generating a total revenue of about $ 63 millions during 2000. However, some 25 years 
ago, the company started with a capital of $200, as a tiny family run venture. One of the 
reasons for this tremendous change is through linkages with multinationals. ENGTEK 
has engaged in closely-knit supplier partnerships with world-class multinationals. For 
example, Intel provided financial as well as technical assistance needed for the company to 
produce semi-automated wire bonder in 1981. As a first-tier suppliers company, 
ENGTEK has been able to link up to the global production systems of its multinational 
clients, moving up the value chain over time. Partnership also helped ENGREK to 
internationalize and to become a multinational on its own4.  
 
Field research (conducted by UNCTAD in India in 2001) involved interviews with four 
leading foreign affiliate of multinationals in the food processing industry of India. It 
reveals that each firm on average sourced 93 percent of their raw material and 74 percent 
of other inputs. This high level was achieved in part as a result of comprehensive efforts 
by these companies to assist in the development of local suppliers, including collaboration 
in production development, technology transfer and training, introduction of contract 
farming and financial assistance. Technology transfer to local farmer has apparently had a 
positive impact. For example, prior to Pepsi’s activities (in 1989), the tomato yields 16 
ton/hecare; by 1999, the yield of its suppliers had increased to 52 ton/hectare.  
 
Evidence also shows how firms in China, the country of primary interest to us, benefit 
from backward linkages. For example, Nestle operates 18 factories in China. In 1992, 
much of the company’s supplies were imported. It decided in 1994 to engage in active 
supplier development, and by 1997, 98 percent of its needs were covered by local 
suppliers. The company worked with local suppliers to help them meet quality standards 
by providing information, technical assistance and sometimes also financial support. 
Nestlé’s efforts to establish quality control procedures contributed to an improvement of 
the competitiveness of suppliers, and some of them subsequently exported to Russia, 
 
4 Source: UNCTAD, based on ENGTEK’s presentation at the workshop on technological and managerial upgrading of 
SMEs through linkages. August 2000. 
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Korea and elsewhere in Asia. So far, 109 of the 145 suppliers Nestle has dealt with are 
local.5   
 
Similarly, working in full partnership with China’s State Development and Planning 
Commission (SDPC), Motorola has established the Center for Enterprises Excellence, a 
program to provide high-level training to selected state-owned enterprises. The main 
objective of the program is a develop Motorola’s supplier base by strengthening especially 
quality, production and productivity through classroom and on-site instruction. Recently 
the program was extended beyond Beijing to the interior of Western China. By 2001, 449 
enterprises from 23 provinces, covering 1516 chief executive officers, middle level 
managers and technicians for 85 enterprises had participated in the program. The trainees 
come from a wide range of industries, including electronics, telecommunications, 
computer hardware, software, media and general trading or commercial enterprises. By 
2000, the average percentage of locally manufactured parts and components in a cellular 
phone manufactured in a Motorola plant in China had reached 65 percent. It is expected 
that Motorola’s local procurement will exceed $1.5 billion, and the number of local 
suppliers will exceed 1000 by the end of 2001.6  
 
One important thing to keep in mind is, although foreign affiliates may benefit local 
suppliers a great deal in terms of information, technology and global linkages, the 
technological advancement of local suppliers plays a major part in attract foreign clients. 
For instance, Nestlé’s selection of suppliers in China are based on strict criteria, including 
the acceptance of Nestlé’s specification, acceptance of audits and inspection, the existence 
of a well-structure quality assurance systems, technical competence in their field of activity, 
good quality record, reliability and economic viability. In Argentina, as another example, 
one supplier delivers a particulate product to all outlets of Carrefours or McDonalds, two 
of the world’s most famous processed food retailers. Thus, suppliers need to operate in a 
sufficient scale to meet the demand of the entire network (Green and Tozanli 2001).  
 
Discussed above are examples of how backward linkage has benefited suppliers. Here is 
some other evidence of backward linkages from FDI around the world. In some 
 
5 Source: UNCTAD, based on Nestle 2001 and company interviews. 
6 Source: UNCTAD, based on Motorola, 2001 
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developed countries, affiliates source between 10 and 20 percent of their inputs locally (i.e. 
supplied by domestic and foreign-owned suppliers). The average percentage of local 
sourcing observed in studies of various UK regions, for instance, ranges form 10 to 25 
percent (UNCTAD 2001). Some evidence suggests that local procurement increases over 
time. In Ireland, raw material sourced locally as a percentage of total raw material inputs in 
non-food manufacturing increased from 16 percent in 1986 to 19 percent in 1994. And in 
a sample of affiliates in the electronics sector, the percentage of raw materials and 
components procured locally increased from 8 percent to 24 percent in the same period 
(Gorg and Ruane 1998).  
 
In developing countries, the share of locally sourced input by foreign affiliates varies by 
industry and region. Local sourcing by foreign affiliates is particularly low in the garments 
industry-between 5 and 10 percent. (UNCTAD 2000A). In the Dominican Republic and 
Costa Rica, for example, very limited subcontracting was observed. In Morocco, similarly, 
the share of inputs from domestic and foreign-owned suppliers of the garment industry 
was estimated at only 10 percent in the late 1990s. In the electronics industry, for example, 
foreign affiliates in the color TV industry in Tijuana, Mexico, sourced 28 percent of their 
inputs locally, of which only 3 percent was supplied by Mexican-owned firms (Carrillo 
2001). Meanwhile, in Malaysia, locally produced components by foreign affiliates in the 
electronic industries comprised 62 percent of exports in 1994. In the automobile industry, 
such as in Mexico, local content form Mexican-owned suppliers stood at 30 percent by 
1995. In Brazil, local content in the automobile industry had been at a very high 85 
percent in 1990. In China, a policy of “localization” stipulated that foreign affiliates in the 
automobile industry had to source 40 to 50 percent to inputs locally. Several foreign 
affiliates reached this target, many by inducing their foreign suppliers to invest in China. 
For example, the share of Shanghai Volkswagen Company’s local sourcing from affiliates 
stood at 26 percent in 2000, measured as purchases from foreign invested suppliers in 
total local purchases. (Xia and Lu 2001).  
 
4.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
When we refer to backward linkages, what we are really interested in is the technology 
transfer through backward linkages. Thus, we test if firms with stronger linkage with 
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multinational clients should enjoy higher productivity. This hypothesis is easily justified 
because with more intermediate goods demanded, a slight reduction in supplier price (or 
improvement in quality) will benefit multinational buyers more greatly. Hence, they may 
have greater incentives to transfer technology in order to reduce supplier costs (or 
improve quality).  
 
We have to point out, however, that technology transfer to the home supplier creates a 
trade-off for the multinational. It benefits the multinational by lowering the price of home 
intermediate. On the other hand, such technology transfer also lowers the cost of 
production of the multinational by lowering the price of the home intermediate. For 
example, if local producers use intermediate input more intensively than multinationals, a 
slight decrease in input prices may induce a lot more output supply in the final product 
market, drag down market price and ultimately hurt multinationals. Multinationals will not 
transfer technology to suppliers if they cannot gain from it. Local suppliers, consequently, 
lose a channel for technology upgrading. Thus, we are going to test whether or not 
backward linkages bring productivity gain to local suppliers in Chapter 5.  
 
Regarding backward linkage, there are many other theories and implications. For example, 
Pack and Saggi (2001) suggests that if technology diffusion to other upstream firms allows 
more capable suppliers to enter, then one would expect market concentration and input 
prices to fall. Further, there are impacts on downstream local competitors due to so-call 
“second round” diffusion. There are also creations of larger varieties of inputs brought 
about by backward linkage from FDI, as suggested by Rodriguez-Clare (1996). However, 
we cannot perform tests on each of these theories at this current stage due to data 
limitation. But still, tests of backward linkage on technology transfer provide us some 
valuable insides on the role of backward linkage effect in China.   
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C h a p t e r  5  
TESTING THE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER THROUGH 
BACKWARD LINKAGES IN CHINA 
 
We follow the approach of Blalock and Gertler (2004) and Javorcik (2004) by assuming a 
Cobb-Douglas production function for both firm and industry level data estimations.  
5.1 Firm Level Pooled Data Tests 
The data7 used for firm level tests come from the Chinese Enterprises and Companies 
Database (CECDB), created by Wanfang Corporation in 1988. CECDB provides over 
160, 000 pieces of firm information in 96 sectors, including the twenty- eight two- digit 
manufacturing sectors in accordance with China’s Statistical Yearbook. The information 
includes firm geographical locations, total sales, fixed asset, number of workers and 
foreign ownership (joint ventures or wholly foreign owned). From the huge dataset, eighty 
firms are randomly selected by computer from each of the two- digit sectors, resulting in a 
sample of 1756 establishments spanning over the period 1999-2002, after missing values 
are eliminated.8  
5.11. Testing Backward Linkage on Firm Level Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
We first adopt the same model as Javorcik (2004) as follows:  
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  (5.1) 
 
where , , , and  are output, capital, labor and material input of firm i 
(located in region r) in sector j at time t. In this model, output is regressed against capital, 
labor and material to capture firm level total factor productivity (TFP), backward, forward 
ijrtY ijrtK ijrtL ijrtM
                                                 
7 Please refer to A1 for detailed descriptions of firm data.  
8 Firm information in CECDB is constantly updated, with old information replaced (rather than extended) over time. We 
thank the Chinese University of Hong Kong for allowing us to retrieve the firm data from the CECDB.  
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and horizontal FDI are added accordingly to see if any of these spillover variables will 
have effects on firm TFP. Equation (5.1) also contains 27 industry dummy variables noted 
by dj and 3 time dummy variables noted by dt. The FDI (dummy) variable takes the value 
of 0 if a firm has not foreign investment and 1 otherwise.  Output takes the value of firm 
total revenue, capital takes the value of fixed assets and labor is defined as number of 
workers.  
 
The CECDB unfortunately does not contain values of material input. We thus estimated a 
firm’s materials by apportioning the regional and industrial total material inputs, which are 
available in China’s Industrial Statistical Yearbooks and Statistical Yearbooks of each 
province, to each firm in the sample by its relative size. In particular,  
 
 
jrt
jrt
ijrtijrt
Y
MYM =   (5.2) 
 
Moreover, to count on the technological and organizational differences between foreign 
companies (especially multinationals) and Chinese firms, we also distinguish foreign firms 
from domestic firms in our sample. Equation (5.2) thus becomes, 
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where d refers to domestic firm and f, foreign firm.9
 
However, such approximation causes one variable (material input) to be highly correlated 
with the independent variable (output). In order to avoid the problem of multicolinearity, 
we test the equation again using value added, which is defined as output minus material 
input, to see if there is any structural change.  
                                                 
9 This is the most refined estimation we are able to obtain from data available. A drawback of such estimation is of 
course that it incurs a strong linear relationship between output and material input.  
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  (5.4) 
where , , and are value added, capital, and labor firm i (located in region r) in 
sector j at time t. d
ijrtVA ijrtK ijrtL
j are industry dummy variables and dt. time dummy variables.  
5.12. Calculation of Horizontal, Backward Linkage and Foreign Linkage Ratios 
Turning to proxies for spillovers, horizontal FDI is measured by the proportion of an 
industry’s output produced by foreign funded enterprises (both wholly foreign owned and 
joint ventures): 
 
jt
jt
jtFDIHorizontal
output  total
 enterprise fundedforeign  ofoutput _ =   (5.5) 
where j, t refers to upstream manufacturing sector j at time t.10 Therefore, horizontal FDI 
measures the presence of foreign investment in a given sectors. Table 7 lists the horizontal 
FDI ratio in the 28 two-digit Chinese manufacturing sectors in year 2003. From the table, 
we learn that foreign presence in 2003 is highest in Electronic and Telecommunications 
Equipments sectors, accounting for 77% of total output and lowest in Tobacco 
processing, where there is little foreign participation.  
Backward linkage, in principle, should be defined as the share of a firm’s output that is 
sold to foreign-owned firms. However, we would then have to worry about the 
endogeneity of a particular firm’s decision to sell to multinationals customers. Moreover, 
since the firm-level dataset does not provide information about backward linkages of the 
firm concerned, we follow Javorcik (2004) to use the backward FDI values that are 
calculated as the share of an industry’s output purchased by downstream foreign funded 
enterprises in the host country. The implication is that the stronger linkage a sector has 
with multinationals, the higher productivity firms in that sector should enjoy. In particular, 
                                                 
10 Our method of calculating horizontal FDI is modified from Blalock (2001), who estimated industry horizontal FDI by ∑∑= ii , where i refers to firm i in sector j, and FDI is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if foreign capital accounts for at least ten percent of a firm’s total output. Since the 
exact data of foreign output and total output of industries can be found in China’s statistical yearbook, we simply 
calculate horizontal FDI by taking the ratio, which gives the same economic meaning. 
ijtijtijtjt outputoutputFDIhorizontal /)*(
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it is the sum of output shares purchased by all downstream manufacturing sectors 
weighted by the share of foreign output in those sectors (horizontal FDI):  
 ∑
≠
=
jkk
ktjkjt HorizontalFDIBackward
 if 
*_ α   (5.6) 
where is the proportion of upstream sector j’s output purchased by downstream sector 
k, which can be obtained from the input-output table. Inputs supplied within a sector are 
not included, since they are already included in the horizontal FDI variable. As an 
illustration, suppose that the textile sector sells 20% of its output to the furniture industry, 
30% to papermaking, and 50% to garment, in which the shares of foreign output are 3%, 
8% and 6%, respectively: 
jka
 
 Textile
 
Furniture 0.2 Papermaking 0.3 Garment 0.4 
 
 Horizontal_FDI 0.03 Horizontal_FDI 0.08 Horizontal_FDI 0.06 
 
Then, we know that the approximately 0.6% of textile sector’s output is purchased by 
foreign firms in the furniture sector. Since textile also sells its output to papermaking and 
Garment sectors, we simply sum up the ratios and obtain the linkage ratio for textile 
sector. 054.006.0*4.008.0*3.003.0*2.0_ =++=jFDIBackward , implying that 
approximately 6% of textile output is sold to foreign enterprises. In other words, the ratio 
of backward linkages generated by FDI related enterprises to its textile industry is 0.054.  
The same principle applies to the forward linkage variable. It is defined as the weighted 
share of output in upstream sectors produced by firms with foreign capital participation 
(Javorcik 2004). As only intermediates sold in the domestic market are relevant to this 
study, goods produced by foreign firms for exports are excluded. Thus, the formula is 
defined as, 
 ∑
≠ −
−=
jmifm mtmt
mtmt
mjjt
XTotal
XForeignForward
  
σ   (5.7) 
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where mjσ  is the share of inputs purchased by industry j from industry m. Xmt is the value 
of export of industry m at time t. For the same reason as before, inputs purchased within 
the sectors are excluded. However, the data for sectoral export are only provided for the 
year 2001~2003, thus, they are assumed to be zero for the year 1999 and 2000. This is 
justified because 1) the observations in year 1999 and 2000 take only a minority of total 
sample size, which implies they cannot affect the result significantly, and 2) we are mainly 
testing the effects of backward linkage, while considering forward linkage, the same as 
horizontal spillovers, as control variables.  
Table 7. Backward linkage (local sourcing rate), forward linkage and horizontal FDI (foreign 
presence) in year 2003 
Industries 
Backward 
Linkage 03
Horizontal 
FDI 03 
Forward 
FDI 03 
Food Processing                                 0.01 0.27 0.05 
Food Manufacturing                              0.08 0.39 0.01 
Beverage Manufacturing                          0.07 0.32 0.01 
Tobacco Processing                              0.04 0.01 0.00 
Textile Industry                                0.03 0.24 0.11 
Garments and Other Fiber Products               0.13 0.46 0.01 
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products        0.08 0.51 0.02 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane and Palm Fiber 0.05 0.26 0.12 
Furniture Manufacturing                         0.14 0.50 0.02 
Papermaking and Paper Products                  0.05 0.31 0.14 
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction         0.14 0.34 0.05 
Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods          0.18 0.59 0.01 
Petroleum Processing and Coking                 0.02 0.10 0.07 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products    0.05 0.24 0.12 
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products             0.06 0.22 0.00 
Chemical Fiber                                  0.12 0.20 0.19 
Rubber Products                                 0.10 0.37 0.14 
Plastic Products                                0.11 0.43 0.16 
Nonmetal Mineral Products                       0.07 0.17 0.04 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals         0.04 0.09 0.15 
Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals      0.03 0.13 0.17 
Metal Products                                  0.06 0.35 0.09 
Ordinary Machinery                              0.08 0.25 0.08 
Special Purpose Equipment                       0.12 0.20 0.04 
Transport Equipment                             0.09 0.40 0.02 
Electric Equipment and Machinery                0.15 0.35 0.08 
Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment     0.08 0.77 0.04 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery 0.17 0.68 0.05 
Average ratio 0.08 0.33 0.07 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 2004 and IO table 1997 
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Table 7 lists the calculated linkage ratios in year 2003. From the information given, we 
know the sector in 2003 that has the highest backward linkage with downstream 
multinationals is cultural, educational, and sports goods, which sells 18% of its output to 
foreign clients. Food processing, other the other extreme, sells only 1% of its input to 
foreign clients. Foreign linkage is largest for chemical fiber, counting for 19% of its output 
and smallest for Tobacco processing, where it purchases nothing from multinational 
suppliers.  
Two Input-Output (IO) Tables of China are used to calculate the backward linkage 
coefficients (as well as jka mjσ ):  The values of  (jka mjσ ) from 1994 to 1995 follow from 
the “direct input coefficients” 1992 IO table (which is not applicable for firm level test, 
but are used for industry level test in the next section), whereas the values for the years 
from 1996 to 2003 are based on the 1997 IO table. 11  12  In any event, while the 
coefficients taken from the IO table remain fixed for some years, horizontal FDI values 
do change over time so the resulting estimations for backward linkages are time- varying 
sector-specific variables (Javorcik 2004). 
5.13. Regression Results for Robust Cluster Test on Firm Level TFP 
We performed robust cluster test, instead of the traditional OLS estimation, because the 
dataset is unbalanced and that some several variables are also used in explaining firm level 
productivity. As Moulton (1990) illustrates, the OLS method is usually based upon the 
assumption of independent disturbances, which is not appropriate for disturbances with 
grouped structure13. As a result, OLS method can lead to standard errors that are seriously 
biased downward. This can in turn result in spurious findings of statistical significance for 
the aggregate variables of interest. Thus, we utilize robust cluster test techniques to cluster 
standard errors in the same industry and year, allowing disturbances to be correlated 
within groups.  
                                                 
11 China revises its national Input-Output tables about every five years. The 2003 Table is still under progress. 
12 Sectors in the IO Tables are re-grouped so as to match the industry classifications for two-digit level industries in 
China’s Statistical Yearbook. 
13 Such as in our model, sectoral variables horizontal and backward FDI are regressed to explain firm level productivity.  
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The regression results of equation (5.1) and (5.4) are shown in table 8a and b and 9a and b. 
We first perform regression on all firms (domestic and foreign) with FDI dummy added, 
and then test of effects on domestic firms and foreign firms separately. Suspecting that 
backward linkage may take some time to materialize, we also test equation (5.1) and (5.4) 
with backward and horizontal FDI one year lagged14.  
 
 
Table 8a. Robust cluster test on backward, forward and horizontal FDI of current year (firm level 
pooled 1999~2002)  
        Ln (Output)       
    All Firms   Domestic   Foreign 
Ln(Capital) 0.02** 0.02**  0.02* 0.24*  0.01*** 0.10*** 
  (2.12) (2.11)  (1.67) (1.67)  (2.90) (2.88) 
Ln(Labor)  0.02* 0.02*  0.02* 0.02*  0.01* 0.01* 
  (1.75) (1.87)  (1.85) (1.90)  (1.86) (1.89) 
Ln(Material) 0.94*** 0.94***  0.93*** 0.93***  0.97*** 0.97*** 
  (33.64) (33.01)  (25.44) (25.43)  (68.58) (68.75) 
Backward 3.46** 4.10***  4.12*** 4.97***  -5.36** -6.89** 
  (2.32) (3.15)  (2.84) (3.81)  (-2.01) (-2.49) 
Horizontal   0.59*   0.75*   -0.43 
   (1.75)   (1.95)   (-1.04) 
Forward   -0.65**   -0.66**   -0.86 
   (-2.17)   (-2.04)   (-1.32) 
FDI Dummy   0.03**       
   (2.17)       
Constant  -0.01 -0.44  -0.08 -0.63*  1.30*** 1.85*** 
 (-0.03) (-1.37)  (-0.29) (-1.78)  (3.14) (3.70) 
27 Industry dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
3 Time dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Number of Obs 1756 1756  1240 1240  516 516 
Number of Groups 93 93  93 93  55 55 
R2 0.97 0.97  0.97 0.97  0.98 0.98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Forward linkage is not lagged because data for export, one variable in calculating forward linkage would be missing for 
year 1999, 2000, 2001, causing too much bias.  
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Table 8b. Robust cluster test on backward, forward, and horizontal FDI with one year lagged (firm 
level pooled 1999~2000) 
        Ln (Output)       
    All Firms   Domestic   Foreign 
Ln(Capital) 0.02** 0.02**  0.02* 0.23*  0.01*** 0.10*** 
  (2.11) (2.11)  (1.67) (1.67)  (2.92) (2.90) 
Ln(Labor)  0.02* 0.02*  0.02* 0.02*  0.01* 0.01* 
  (1.77) (1.85)  (1.87) (1.87)  (1.82) (1.83) 
Ln(Material) 0.94*** 0.94***  0.93*** 0.93***  0.97*** 0.97*** 
  (33.56) (32.89)  (25.38) (25.37)  (67.95) (67.75) 
Backwardt-1 0.12 0.28  -0.30 0.00  -1.86** -1.52** 
  (0.16) (0.35)  (-0.28) (0.00)  (-2.34) (-2.03) 
Horizontalt-1   -0.08*   -0.10   0.13 
   (-0.30)   (-0.32)   (0.29) 
Forward   -0.73**   -0.77**   -0.78 
   (-2.23)   (-2.08)   (-1.17) 
FDI Dummy   0.03**       
   (2.12)       
Constant  0.52*** 0.58***  0.62*** 0.66**  0.17 0.13 
 (4.00) (2.68)  (3.48) (2.23)  (1.32) (0.54) 
27 Industry dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
3 Time dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Number of Obs 1756 1756  1240 1240  516 516 
Number of Groups 93 93  93 93  55 55 
R2 0.97 0.97  0.97 0.97  0.98 0.98 
Note: tests of backward and horizontal with two years lagged give similar results to one year lagged and thus 
not are reported here. 
 
 
We observe without surprise that coefficients on capital and labor are positive and 
significant. The exceptional significance of material input is perhaps due to apportioning 
material inputs to each firm by its firm size, so is the usual large R-square. As can seen in 
table 9a and b, if we use value added as the dependent variable and eliminate material 
from the right hand side, the R-square drop to below 0.6. Nonetheless, we argue here that 
although the inclusion of estimated material input does weaken the statistical significance 
of capital and labor to some extent, for capital, labor and material are known to be related, 
it does not affect much of backward linkage and horizontal FDI, since correlation 
between material and these two variables are no more than 0.1 in absolute value. FDI 
dummy, as consistent with all previous studies, is positive and significant, suggesting that 
firms with foreign fund participations outperform their domestic counterparts. For 
instance, the coefficient 0.03 represents given the same amount of capital and labor and 
other things the same, foreign firms generate 3 million yuan more than domestic firms.  
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Table 9a. Robust cluster test on backward, forward, and horizontal FDI of current year (firm level 
pooled 1999~2002)  
  
        Ln (Value Added)       
    All Firms   Domestic   Foreign 
Ln(Capital) 0.30*** 0.29***  0.27*** 0.27***  0.30*** 0.30*** 
  (10.05) (10.39)  (8.38) (8.36)  (7.08) (7.10) 
Ln(Labor)  0.31*** 0.32***  0.35*** 0.35***  0.22*** 0.22*** 
  (8.24) (8.60)  (8.17) (8.18)  (4.32) (4.34) 
Backward 10.54 16.18**  12.72 19.41***  -23.68 -38.00 
  (1.08) (2.17)  (1.53) (2.97)  (0.60) (-0.85) 
Horizontal   5.72***   6.79***   -1.27 
   (3.91)   (4.33)   (-0.20) 
Forward   -2.19   -1.65   -8.92 
   (-1.46)   (-1.14)   (-0.77) 
FDI Dummy   0.22***       
   (2.26)       
Constant  2.11 -2.26  1.52 -3.54**  8.24 11.71 
 (1.36) (-1.47)  (1.13) (-2.28)  (1.34) (1.45) 
27 Industry dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
3 Time dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Number of Obs 1745 1745  1231 1231  514 514 
Number of Groups 93 93  93 93  55 55 
R2 0.58 0.59  0.63 0.64  0.49 0.49 
 
 
Table 9b. Robust cluster test on backward, forward, and horizontal FDI with one year lagged (firm 
level pooled 1999~2000) 
        Ln (Value Added)       
    All Firms   Domestic   Foreign 
Ln(Capital) 0.30*** 0.29***  0.26*** 0.26***  0.30*** 0.30*** 
  (9.79) (10.06)  (8.05) (8.09)  (6.93) (6.94) 
Ln(Labor)  0.30*** 0.32***  0.35*** 0.36***  0.22*** 0.22*** 
  (8.07) (8.60)  (8.07) (8.21)  (4.22) (4.23) 
Backward 25.98** 17.90*  25.21** 17.88*  -19.05** -19.37**
  (2.08) (1.96)  (2.04) (1.76)  (2.62) (2.60) 
Horizontal   4.15*   4.30*   -0.52 
   (1.89)   (1.82)   (-0.13) 
Forward   -7.30**   -7.26**   -6.75***
   (-2.80)   (-2.49)   (-6.18) 
FDI Dummy   0.22***       
   (3.59)       
Constant  -0.27 -1.24  -0.41 -1.48  1.49 5.06** 
 (-0.15) (-0.82)  (-0.21) (-0.49)  (1.38) (2.22) 
27 Industry dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
3 Time dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Number of Obs 1745 1745  1231 1231  514 514 
Number of Groups 93 93  93 93  55 55 
R2 0.56 0.58  0.61 0.62  0.49 0.53 
Note: tests of backward and horizontal FDI with two years lagged give similar results to one year lagged and 
thus are not reported here. 
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Backward linkage is found to be positive and significant for the cases of all firms and 
domestic suppliers, representing the productivity of firms in a sector increased when the 
share of their output sold to foreign-owned firms increase. The coefficient of backward 
linkage implies the rate of change in value added with respect to backward linkage ratio, 
given other things the same. Note that it is generally big because backward linkage ratio is 
very small, about 0.08 on average. This finding is similar to that in Javorcik (2004), 
indicating evidence of technology transfer through the channel of backward linkage to 
suppliers in host country. Backward linkage performs negative impact on foreign firms. 
We suspect this is due to, first, foreign firms are already technology-advanced and do not 
need these “spillovers”, and second, the improvement of domestic performance from 
backward linkage generate competition effect to foreign firms in upstream industries. Also 
note that horizontal FDI, after we control for differences in productivity across sectors, 
still gives positive and robust results, suggesting a horizontal spillover effect to domestic 
industry, but has no effect on foreign firms, possible because foreign firms are already 
technology-advanced, therefore do not need to learn from other foreign competitors. 
Forward linkage, surprisingly, appear to be negative and significant, the reason of which is 
not known yet. One can argue that the transfer of technology to local suppliers may take 
some time to materialize. To examine lagged effects of FDI, we conducted the above 
cluster test by using one year lagged values of FDI variables. However, the results for 
backward linkages with one year’s lagged are not significant for equation (5.1) when we 
use output as the dependent variable (table 8b), but remain robust for equation (5.4) when 
we take value added as the dependent variable (table 9b). The reason of this difference in 
robustness can be explained by that material input in table 8b take too much significance 
(about 95%) of the dependent variable, thus weaken the effects of others. When it is 
eliminated, we get the robust result for backward linkage in table 9b.  
5.14. Testing the Effects of Backward Linkage on Firm Level Labor Productivity 
As is also discussed in Chapter 4, staff training is another important way multinationals 
transfer technology to their suppliers. Hence, we intend to test the effects of backward 
linkages on labor productivity, which according to China’s Statistical Yearbook, is defined 
as value added per worker: 
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where labor productivity is the value added per worker at each firm i in sector j at time t.  
Table 10. Robust cluster test of backward linkage on labor productivity (firm level pooled 1999~2002) 
  Ln (labor productivity) 
    All Firms   Domestic   Foreign 
Backward 66.87 9.01*  63.75* 13.48**  5.00 -51.98* 
  (1.64) (1.98)  (1.66) (2.43)  (0.08) (-1.71) 
Horizontal   5.96***   6.47***   -1.93 
   (4.03)   (3.71)   (-0.39) 
Forward   -4.07**   -2.77*   -11.77 
   (-2.31)   (-1.69)   (-1.35) 
Ln(Capital)  -0.02   -0.06*   0.06*** 
   (-0.81)   (-1.89)   (1.49) 
FDI Dummy   0.36***       
   (3.59)       
Constant  -8.81 -2.72**  -8.37 -3.67**  1.81 12.21** 
 (-1.37) (-2.34)  (-1.44) (-2.46)  (1.09) (2.26) 
27 Industry dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
3 Time dummy  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Number of Obs 1745 1745  1231 1231  514 514 
Number of Groups 93 93  93 93  55 55 
R2 0.13 0.26  0.13 0.30  0.49 0.22 
Note: Tests of backward linkage with one and two years lagged gives similar results and thus are not 
reported here. 
The regression results are presented in table 13. Similarly, we test the effect of backward 
linkage alone first, and then test the mixed effect of backward, forward and horizontal 
FDI. Finally, minding that capital might affect labor productivity, we add capital at the last 
column of each test. From the results, we see that backward linkages have a positive but 
not strong impact on firm-level labor productivity for the whole sample and domestic 
firms only. The results, nonetheless, still give evidence of backward linkage ratio increase 
is associated with labor productivity raise. We also observed that other FDI effects, such 
as horizontal and partnership effects, also positively contribute to the labor productively 
of suppliers. Forward linkage, still gives negative effects, while the reason is unknown. 
The results remain unchanged when we lag backward linkage and horizontal FDI for one 
and two years. However, capital input displays little or even negative effect on labor 
productivity. We suspect this is due to the correlation between capital and labor is higher 
than between value added. When we observe these FDI effects on foreign firms, we find 
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that none of them suggest positive impact. This is not surprising to us because foreign 
firms are already advanced in technology and do not need these “spillovers”. In addition, 
increased labor productivity of local firms generates competition effects to foreign firms.  
5.2 Industry Level Panel Data Tests 
While firm level data provide us micro view on the spillover effects of FDI, we would also 
want to see the effects of backward linkage on industry performance over a longer period.    
5.21. Test of Backward Linkage on Industrial Level TFP 
In the model using industrial panel dataset, value added is regressed on capital and labor, 
all in logarithm, to capture industry level total factor productivity (TFP or technology)15
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where  , ,  are value added, capital and labor for industry j at time t. Backward 
and horizontal FDI
jtVA jtK jtL
16 are added accordingly to test the effects of these two variables on 
industrial TFP. Finally, we add 8 time dummy variables to capture the productivity 
changes which are independent of the backward and horizontal linkages. The data used in 
industry level test come from the China’s Statistical Yearbook consisting of a balanced 
panel spanning over the period 1994-2002, excluding 1998 due to missing value of foreign 
output in calculating horizontal FDI. I also restrict my sample to the 28 manufacturing 
sectors17 classified by China’s Statistical Yearbook only, which then constitutes a sample 
of 224 observations. I defined value added as industry value added in money term. Capital 
as annual average of net value of fixed assets and labor as number of industrial workers. 
                                                 
15 In Aitken and Harrison (1999), Blalock and Gertler (2004 and Javorcik (2004), output is regressed on capital, labor and 
material input jtjtjtjtjt MLKY εββββ ++++= 21 lnlnlnln 30 to capture productivity. However, from our data 
we find that material is highly correlated with labor (0.73) and capital (0.86). To avoid multicolinearity, we instead use 
value added, which equals output minus intermediate input, while eliminating material from the right hand side of the 
equation.  
16 Forward linkage is not included due to missing data.  
17 It is argued that backward linkage can be generalized mainly between manufacturing sectors. Please refer to World 
Investment Report: Promoting linkages (2001) 
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Both value added and capital are deflated by producer price index (PPI) to 1997 value, the 
year of input-output table18.  
 
5.22. Industrial Panel (Pool vs. Random vs. Fixed Effect Models) Test Results 
(With Time Dummy variables vs. Without Time Dummy variables) 
 
Table 11a and b show industry level results under both the pooled data OLS regression 
and panel data estimations (random effect vs. fixed effects). Pooled OLS put data of 
various years together as cross-sectional data. Random effect estimation assumes each 
variable to be independent of the disturbances term, while fixed effect allows the constant 
term to vary between industries, and it is equivalent to pooled OLS with 27 industry 
dummy variables. To test if the difference in coefficients between random and fixed 
effects are systematic or not, we use hausman test to tell which test (random vs. fixed) is 
more suited in this regression model. We first test the effects of backward linkages alone 
on industry-level productivity, and then horizontal effects are added. Forward linkage is 
not tested here due to missing data of sectoral exports during 1994 to 2000. Minding that 
technology transfer cannot take place immediately, we test backward linkages effects in 
the same year as well as for value lagged one year.  Surprisingly, backward linkage, in spite 
of current year or one year lagged, performs little or even negative effects on industry 
productivity. Horizontal FDI are positive, as it should be since an industry with greater 
foreign presence should have higher TFP because foreign firms are known to be more 
productive, as we can see in table 4. However, when we run the regression again without 
time dummy variables, backward linkage effects of FDI become positive and significant 
except for the pooled data model (table 12a and 12b), suggesting higher local sourcing 
ratio is associated with higher TFP in the upstream sectors. The reason, as we suspect, is 
that we are using 1992 and 1997 (mainly 1997) input-output tables to calculate backward 
linkage ratio from year 1994 to 2003, spanning over a decade. Therefore, we might 
suspect the backward linkage ratio to be quite stable over the year and fails to capture the 
real change over this period when FDI is booming and industrial structures are changing 
dramatically in China. Thus, adding of time dummy variables may explain more of the 
productivity change and drag away the robustness of backward linkage. Horizontal FDI, 
 
18 Please see A2 for detailed descriptions of industry data.  
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on the contrary, uses the real yearly value and captures the real change and therefore, is 
positive and significant for all cases. Finally, to see which model is better suited to our 
regression equations, we conduct Hausman test to tell if the difference in coefficients 
between random and fixed effects are systematic. Large Hausman value indicates fixed 
effects are better for this model. The Hausman test value is shown at the bottom of each 
table. Generally speaking, the Hausman tests show that fixed effects are better for the 
model, which is fairly reasonable since the nature of each industry varies and industry 
dummy variables can be used to filter other effects that are not explained by our variables. 
Nonetheless, the test results for backward linkage are similar for both random and fixed 
effects.  
 
Table 11a. Industry level panel data estimation of backward and horizontal FDI of current year on 
TFP (1994~2003, excluding 1998): Pooled vs. Random (RE) vs. Fixed (FE) effect models, with time 
trend 
 
        Ln (Value Added)       
    Pooled   RE   FE 
Ln(Capital) 0.49*** 0.53***  0.25*** 0.24***  0.18*** 0.15*** 
  (9.57) (9.66)  (5.03) (4.87)  (3.54) (2.74) 
Ln(Labor)  0.31*** 0.28***  0.60*** 0.61***  0.64*** 0.68*** 
  (6.18) (5.40)  (9.80) (9.95)  (9.12) (9.70) 
Backward_FDI -1.68** -2.20**  -0.24 -0.68  0.52 -0.26 
  (-2.16) (-2.68)  (-0.31) (-0.82)  (0.61) (-0.30) 
Horizontal_FDI  0.54*   0.43   0.99*** 
   (1.92)   (1.53)   (2.94) 
Time dummy   yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Constant  1.81*** 1.61***  2.02*** 1.89***    
  (6.97) (5.78)  (6.29) (5.67)    
Adj R-square  0.80 0.81  0.77 0.75  0.74 0.65 
F  106.13 91.27     90.26 85.79 
Prob>F  0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 
χ2     974.32 938.08    
Prob>χ2     0.00 0.00    
Number of obs 252 252  252 252  252 252 
Number of Groups        28 28  28 28 
Hausman specification test: χ2  = 18.84, prob > χ2 =0.06 
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Table 11b. Industry level panel data estimation of backward and horizontal FDI with one year 
lagged (1994~2003, excluding 1998): Pooled vs. Random (RE) vs. Fixed (FE) effect models, with 
time trend 
        Ln (Value Added)       
    Pooled   RE   FE 
Ln(Capital) 0.48*** 0.54***  0.24*** 0.24***  0.17*** 0.13*** 
  (9.01) (9.46)  (4.79) (4.86)  (3.00) (2.43) 
Ln(Labor)  0.31*** 0.27***  0.58*** 0.59***  0.61*** 0.61*** 
  (5.87) (4.85)  (9.09) (9.41)  (8.19) (8.84) 
Backward_FDIt-1 -1.34 -2.10**  0.71 -0.48  1.70** 0.05 
  (-1.59) (-2.39)  (0.91) (-0.58)  (1.99) (-0.30) 
Horizontal_FDIt-1  0.36***   1.01***   1.71*** 
   (2.68)   (3.63)   (5.39) 
Time dummy   yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Constant  1.77*** 1.48***  2.03*** 1.81***    
  (6.62) (5.18)  (6.22) (5.81)    
Adj R-square  0.80 0.81  0.75 0.70  0.71 0.52 
F  97.97 91.27     75.36 80.89 
Prob>F  0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 
χ2     739.18 796.97    
Prob>χ2     0.00 0.00    
Number of obs 224 224  224 224  224 224 
Number of Groups        28 28  28 28 
 
Hausman specification test: χ2  = 609.20, prob > χ2 =0.00 
Note: Tests of backward and horizontal FDI with two years lagged give similar results and thus are not 
reported here.  
 
 
Table 12a. Industry level panel data estimation of backward and horizontal FDI of current year on 
TFP (1994~2003, excluding 1998): Pooled vs. Random (RE) vs. Fixed (FE) effect models, without 
time trend 
 
        Ln (Value Added)       
    Pooled   RE   FE 
Ln(Capital) 0.61*** 0.61***  0.52*** 0.51***  0.40*** 0.36*** 
  (18.82) (19.24)  (16.39) (15.85)  (10.04) (8.57) 
Ln(Labor)  0.20*** 0.20***  0.15*** 0.17***  0.04 0.09 
  (5.02) (4.89)  (2.91) (3.20)  (0.61) (1.42) 
Backward_FDI -0.17 -1.39*  3.00*** 2.17**  5.71*** 4.48*** 
  (-0.80) (-1.69  (3.14) (2.00)  (5.07) (3.79) 
Horizontal_FDI  0.52***   0.54*   1.23*** 
   (2.68)   (1.69)   (2.99) 
Constant  1.37*** 1.26***  1.89*** 1.77***    
  (6.40) (5.81)  (5.50) (5.02)    
Adj R-square  0.76 0.77  0.73 0.73  0.53 0.36 
F  268.07 207.88     95.37 76.34 
Prob>F  0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 
χ2     346.96 350.89    
Prob>χ2     0.00 0.00    
Number of obs 252 252  252 252  252 252 
Number of Groups        28 28  28 28 
Hausman specification test: χ2  = 36.74, prob > χ2 =0.00 
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Table 12b. Industry level panel data estimation of backward and horizontal FDI with one year 
lagged (1994~2003, excluding 1998): Pooled vs. Random (RE) vs. Fixed (FE) effect models, without 
time trend 
        Ln (Value Added)       
    Pooled   RE   FE 
Ln(Capital) 0.58*** 0.60***  0.49*** 0.48***  0.35*** 0.33*** 
  (16.17) (16.81)  (14.37) (14.30)  (8.75) (8.34) 
Ln(Labor)  0.22*** 0.20***  0.17*** 0.20***  0.04 0.10 
  (5.13) (4.89)  (3.23) (3.71)  (0.65) (1.64) 
Backwardt-1 0.04 -1.48*  3.75*** 2.06*  6.53*** 4.11*** 
  (0.05) (-1.66)  (3.88) (1.86)  (6.00) (3.54) 
Horizontalt-1  0.67***   1.03***   1.78*** 
   (3.21)   (3.17)   (4.60) 
Constant  1.46*** 1.29***  2.03*** 1.80***    
  (6.20) (5.44)  (5.74) (4.98)    
Adj R-square  0.75 0.76  0.71 0.68  0.42 0.24 
F  221.24 175.54     71.22 64.26 
Prob>F  0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 
χ2     261.49 278.91    
Prob>χ2     0.00 0.00    
Number of obs 224 224  224 224  224 224 
Number of Groups        28 28  28 28 
Hausman specification test: χ2  = 70.33, prob > χ2 =0.00 
 
 
5.23. Testing Backward Linkage on Industrial Level Labor Productivity (With 
Time Dummy variables vs. Without Dummy variables) 
 
The same as firm level test, we test if backward linkage will lead to labor productivity raise. 
We first test the effect of backward linkage alone, then adding horizontal FDI and capital 
stock as control variables.  
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The results for equation 5.4 are presented in table 9. Taking account that capital may be 
affecting labor productivity, we also add capital in the last column of each model. The 
same as industry productivity test, we get quite little or even negative results for backward 
linkage. The positive evidence of horizontal FDI again is already predictable because 
foreign firms which are known to have higher labor productivity constitute a larger 
portion of the whole industry and push up the industry-level labor productivity. The 
hausman test this time suggests that random and fixed effects models are quite systematic. 
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However, when we run the regression again without time dummy, the coefficients and t 
statistics of backward linkage become positive and significant except for the pool analysis. 
We suspect the reason is the same as industry TFP test, we are using 1992 and 1997 
(mainly 1997) input-output tables to calculate backward linkage ratio from year 1994 to 
2003, which leads to stable backward linkage ratio over the years and cannot capture the 
real structural change over time. Thus, time dummy variables may explain more of the 
productivity change and drag away the robustness of backward linkage.  Firm level test, on 
the other hand, span over only 4 years (and relatively stable years since FDI inflow starts 
to become stationary and the new statistical standards are in use) and that’s why we obtain 
satisfactory results for firm level test.  
 
Table 13a. Industry panel estimation of backward linkage and horizontal FDI on labor productivity 
(1994~2003, excluding 1998): Pooled vs. Random (RE) vs. Fixed (FE) effect models, with time 
trend 
       Ln (Value Added)       
    Pooled   RE   FE 
Backward_FDIt-1 -4.45*** -4.65***  -0.70 -1.47*  -0.14 -1.19 
 (-5.58) (-4.38)  (-0.84) (-1.70)  (-0.16) (-1.35) 
Horizontal_FDIt-1  -0.37   0.90***   1.33*** 
  (-1.55)   (2.99)   (3.89) 
Ln(Capital)  -0.08*   0.08*   0.05*** 
  (-1.94)   (1.67)   (3.12) 
Time dummy yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Constant 2.13*** 2.82***  1.84*** 1.09***    
 (23.33) (8.06)  (16.27) (3.21)    
Adj R-square 0.52 0.53  0.50 0.44  0.48 0.37 
F 35.84 29.52     244.14 211.90 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 
χ2     1941.43 211.90   
Prob>χ2     0.00 0.00   
Number of obs 252 252  252 252  252 252 
Number of Groups        28 28  28 28 
Hausman specification test: χ2  = 15.96, prob > χ2 =0.11 
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Table 13b. Industry panel estimation of backward linkage and horizontal FDI on labor productivity 
(1994~2003, excluding 1998): Pooled vs. Random (RE) vs. Fixed (FE) effect models, without time 
trend 
     Ln (Labor Productivity) 
    Pooled  RE   FE 
Backward_FDI -2.15*  1.14 12.83***  5.39*** 18.07***  5.91*** 
  (-1.84)  (0.80 (8.93)  (3.86) (12.43)  (4.08) 
Horizontal_FDI   -0.24   1.59***   2.51*** 
    (-0.73)   (3.73)   (5.11) 
Ln(Capital)   0.28***   0.51***   0.45*** 
    (5.87)   (11.72)   (8.93) 
Constant  10.60***  8.64*** 9.56***  6.30***    
  (112.75)  (24.33) (63.14)  (23.04)    
R-square  0.01  0.14 0.01  0.06 0.01  0.02 
χ2     79.66  372.24   148.69 
Prob>χ2     0.00  0.00   0.00 
F  3.38  13.62    71.22   
Prob>F  0.07 0.06 0.00    0.00 0.00  
Number of obs 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
No. of groups        28 28 28 28 28 28 
Hausman specification test: χ2  = 17.75, prob > χ2 =0.00 
Note: Test of backward and horizontal FDI with one year and two year lags give similar results and thus are 
not reported here.  
 
However, as a final note, Aitken and Harrison (1999) point out studies that using data 
aggregated at the sectoral level, were unable to control for differences in productivity 
across sectors which might be correlated with, but not caused by, foreign presence. The 
use of industry level data to test spillover effects on productivity may lead to selection bias 
in the sense that foreign investors may choose to invest in more productive sectors or 
tend to source their intermediate inputs from sectors with higher productivity.  Therefore, 
we believe firm level test gives us more convincing conclusions because it controls the 
variation within each industry to implement the “selection bias” problem in the industry 
test.  
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5.3 Summaries 
Table 14 provides us a summary of our test results, 
Table 14. Summary of test results  
Dependant Variable Data description Test Effects of Backward 
Linkages 
All firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Domestic only pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
TFP (output regressed on 
capital, labor and material 
Foreign firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster -, significant 
All firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Domestic only pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
TFP (value added regressed 
on capital and labor 
Foreign firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster -, significant 
All firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Domestic only pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Labor Productivity 
Foreign firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster -, significant 
Pooled -, significant 
Random -, insignificant 
TFP (value added regressed 
on capital and labor 
Industry-Level Panel  
94-03, with time dummy 
variables 
Fixed -, insignificant 
Pooled -, insignificant 
Random +, significant 
TFP (value added regressed 
on capital and labor 
Industry-Level Panel  
94-03, without time dummy 
variables 
Fixed +, significant 
Pooled -, significant 
Random -, significant 
Labor Productivity Industry-Level Panel  
94-03 
Fixed -, insignificant 
Pooled -, significant 
Random +, significant 
Labor Productivity Industry-Level Panel  
94-03 
Fixed +, significant 
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To conclude, we test the effects of backward linkage on productivity using two datasets- 
firm and industry level data. Firm level data give us convincing evidence of the positive 
effects of backward linkage, indicating that increase backward linkage of FDI will lead to 
productivity gains of those firms in the upstream industries. This includes all firms, as well 
as domestic firms. Industry test, although does not provide evidence of backward linkage 
when time dummy variables are included, we suspect it may be caused by the lack of 
yearly input-output table to capture the real change in local sourcing from FDI. Thus, 
adding of time dummy variables may explain more of the productivity change and drag 
away the robustness of backward linkage. We are waiting for the more updated I-O table 
to revise our test and see if there are significant changes in our estimation results. Finally, 
our test results are consistent with other tests applying the same methodology and our 
theoretical hypothesis.  
Appendix. Data Descriptions 
A1. Firm Data 
The data used for firm level test come from the Chinese Enterprises and Companies 
Database (CECDB), created by Wanfang Corporation in 1988. CECDB provides over 
160, 000 pieces of firm information in 96 sectors, including the twenty- eight two- digit 
manufacturing sectors in accordance with China’s Statistical Yearbook. The information 
includes firm geographical locations, total sales, fixed asset, number of workers and 
foreign ownership (joint ventures or wholly foreign owned). The data are classified by 
either the two-digit or three-digit industries they belong to. In each industry, the computer 
displays the firm information in a random order (generated by computer) and I was 
allowed to get the first 80 firms of each industry. After missing values are eliminated, we 
obtained a sample of 1756 establishments spanning over the period 1999-2002. Because 
the firm data are on updated-basis, and once the information is updated, the old 
information is gone. Thus, the information of year 2002 takes a majority of the sample 
with some unupdated data of year 99, 00 and 01 (table 14b).  
Basic information about the firm dataset is given in table 14a, 14b and 14c. As can be seen, 
a majority of the data is for the year 2002 and over two-thirds of the firms are domestic. 
The sample represents a fairly balanced industry breakdown as give in table 10c.  
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Table 15a. Summary statistics of firm level pooled data 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Output 1756 37996 278993 100 7107038 
Capital 1756 22712 177351 7.5 5000000 
Labor 1756 1214 6562 15 128804 
 
Table 15b. Year and ownership distributions of firm level pooled data 
Year Distribution  Ownership Distribution 
2002 1335 Domestic 1240 
2001 111 Joint-venture 312 
2000 289 Wholly foreign owned 204 
1999 21   
   
Total 1756 Total 1756 
 
Table 15c. Sectoral distributions of firm level pooled data (Total vs. Foreign) 
  Industries Number of obs  ratio 
1 Food Processing                                 64 16 0.25 
2 Food Manufacturing                              66 25 0.38 
3 Beverage Manufacturing                          57 17 0.30 
4 Tobacco Processing                              50 2 0.04 
5 Textile Industry                                68 13 0.19 
6 Garments and Other Fiber Products               66 31 0.47 
7 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products        65 29 0.45 
8 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane and Palm Fiber 51 16 0.31 
9 Furniture Manufacturing                         51 26 0.51 
10 Papermaking and Paper Products                  64 18 0.28 
11 Printing and Record Medium Reproduction         63 18 0.29 
12 Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods          65 36 0.55 
13 Petroleum Processing and Coking                 63 10 0.16 
14 Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products    69 14 0.20 
15 Medical and Pharmaceutical Products             58 6 0.10 
16 Chemical Fiber                                  58 15 0.26 
17 Rubber Products                                 54 13 0.24 
18 Plastic Products                                67 24 0.35 
19 Nonmetal Mineral Products                       64 11 0.17 
20 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals         68 8 0.12 
21 Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals      61 8 0.13 
22 Metal Products                                  67 20 0.30 
23 Ordinary Machinery                              62 10 0.16 
24 Special Purpose Equipment                       67 18 0.27 
25 Transport Equipment                             70 22 0.31 
26 Electric Equipment and Machinery                70 24 0.34 
27 Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment     74 47 0.63 
28 Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery 54 19 0.35 
  Total 1756 516 0.29 
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A2. Industry Data 
The data used in industry level test come from the China’s Statistical Yearbook consisting 
of a balanced panel spanning over the period 1994-2002, excluding 1998 due to missing 
value of foreign output in calculating horizontal FDI. I also restrict my sample to the 28 
manufacturing sectors 19  classified by China’s Statistical Yearbook only, which then 
constitutes a sample of 224 observations. I defined value added as industry value added in 
money term. Capital as annual average of net value of fixed assets, and labor as number of 
industrial workers. Both value added and capital are deflated by producer price index (PPI) 
to 1997 value. Here are the explanatory notes taken from China’s Statistical Yearbook 
2004.  
Value-added of Industry refers to the final results of industrial production of 
industrial enterprises in money terms during the reference period. 
 
Industrial value-added can be calculated by two approaches: the production approach, 
i.e. gross industrial output value minus intermediate input plus value-added tax, and the 
income approach, i.e. income for various factors used in the course of production, 
including depreciation of fixed assets, remuneration of laborers, net of production tax, 
and operating surplus. Value-added of industry in the Yearbook is calculated by 
production approach as following: 
 
Value-added of industry = gross industrial output – industrial intermediate input + 
value-added tax 
 
(1) Gross industrial output: refers to the total achievements of industrial production 
during a given period. Gross industrial output includes value of finished products, 
income from external processing, and value of change in semi-finished products at the 
end and at the beginning of the reference period. Since 1995, it was substituted by the 
gross industrial output value by new method.  
 
(2) Industrial intermediate input: refers to purchased goods and paid services consumed 
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during the industrial production of enterprises. Fees paid for services include fees paid 
for the services provided by material production sectors (industry, agriculture, wholesale 
and retail trade, construction, transport, post and telecommunications) and by non-
material production sectors (insurance, banking, culture, education, scientific research, 
health and medical care, public administration, etc.). The determination of industrial 
intermediate input follows the principle that the goods and services must be purchased 
from outside and included in the gross industrial output, and that the goods and services 
are inputted into production and consumed (include low-value consumables) during the 
reference period. 
 
Annual Average of Net Value of Fixed Assets refer to average of the net value of 
fixed assets during the reference period, calculated with the following formula: 
 
Annual Average of Net Value of Fixed Assets = sum of net value of fixed assets at the 
beginning and at the end of each month from January to December / 24. 
 
Information on this indicator can be obtained from the beginning and ending figures of 
the original value of fixed assets and cumulative depreciation from the Assets and Liability 
Table of enterprises. 
 
Net value of fixed assets refers to the original value of fixed assets minus depreciation 
over the years, i.e.: 
 
Net value of fixed assets = original value of fixed assets – cumulative depreciation. 
 
Average Annual Number of Employed Persons: Employed persons refer to all those 
who are employed in enterprises and receive remunerations there from, including 
currently working employees, retirees who are re-employed, teachers of local-run 
schools, as well as foreigners, staff from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, part-time 
employees and persons with second job who are employed by the enterprise, and 
employees of other units temporarily working in the enterprises, but excluding former 
19 It is argued that backward linkage can be generalized mainly between manufacturing sectors. Please refer to World 
Investment Report: Promoting linkages (2001) 
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employees who left the enterprise with their employment records still kept by the 
enterprises. 
 
Average number of employed persons refers to the number of employees everyday 
during the reference period, calculated with the following formula: 
 
Annual average number = sum of monthly average number in reference year/12. 
 
A3. Input-Output Table(s) 
 
Input-output (IO) tables are edited very 5 years. So far, there are four Chinese IO tables 
in total: 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 real value IO table. In the most recent table-1997 
IO table of China, the entire Chinese economy is divided into 118*118 sectors, of which 
90 are industrial sectors. The basic matrix displays the actual amount of goods (in 
money term) purchased or sold between industries. The column shows the amounts of 
each upstream sector’s output purchased by various downstream sectors and rows 
displays the amounts of each downstream sector’s input supplied by various upstream 
sectors. The “direct input coefficient” matrix is the share (ratio) of each upstream 
sector’s output purchased by its downstream sectors, and each column sums up to unity. 
The basic matrix is combined horizontally and vertically into a 28 * 28 matrix in 
accordance with the manufacturing sectors in China’s Statistical Yearbook and the way 
to calculate backward linkage has already been stated in equation (5.6).  
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C h a p t e r  6  
LIMIATIONS OF RESEARCH 
 
This paper shed some lights on various effects of backward linkage from FDI on the 
development of upstream industries. We find that higher backward linkage is associated 
with higher productivity for both industry level and firm level data. However, there are 
still several limitations of our research. These limitations are generally of two kinds: data 
limitations and methodology limitations.  
6.1 Data Limitations 
The major limitation comes from unavailability of data. For instance, the actual data for 
backward linkage from FDI, the variable of our primary interest, are not available for 
industries and firms. Thus, we have to estimate backward linkage for each industry as 
stated in equation (5.3). Also, the information provided by firm level dataset is limited: we 
would love to have a panel dataset of longer periods so that we can control for time 
variance. Panel firm data can also provide us more convincing evidence on upstream firm 
growth as discussed in chapter 6, and so far, we only perform such test on industry level 
panel data, which suffers the problem of “selection bias”. Moreover, in firm level data, the 
information for total output is not provided. Although total revenue is the closest 
substitute for total output, the existence of inventory is not adjusted. Also, we would 
prefer total wage to the number of workers because it takes into account those high-
skilled and low skilled workers. Most importantly, one crucial variable in predicting total 
factor productivity – material input, is not available, and so that we have to estimate firm 
level material by assuming the input-output ratio in a certain industry at a certain region is 
uniform. Fortunately, the similar regressions results in equation (5.1) and (5.4) suggest that 
our estimation of material input is quite reasonable. Further, due to data limitation, i.e. 
data for investment are not provided, we cannot, like Blalock and Gentler (2004) and 
Javorcik (2004), to apply Olley and Pakes correction to control for the endogeneity of 
input selection and firm exit.  
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Finally, input-output table is available only up to 1997. Ideally we would like to have yearly 
input-output table up to most recent year of our test, which would give us backward 
linkage ratios with strong time variance effects. Since input-output tables are constructed 
in five-year intervals, the best thing we can do so far, is to wait until input-output table 
2003 to be published to revise our tests.  
6.2 Methodology Limitations 
The major methodology limitation goes to the estimation of backward linkages (however, 
this is also due to data limitation because the actual data for backward linkages from FDI 
are not available). We made use of data from input-output table and China Statistical 
Yearbook to approximate the share of output purchased by multinational clients.  
However, such estimation carries the same weight for each industry. However, we know 
the backward linkage incentives of FDI differ among industries in nature. It is also likely 
that the share of input bought domestically by MNCs is lower than for local firms. We do 
not distinguish the backward linkage to local or multinational suppliers, either.  
In addition, as Alfaro and Rodrigues-Clare (2003) pointed out, in differentiated product 
industries, sales revenue and input expenditures are not good proxies for physical output 
and input, leading to underestimation of productivity measures (although both 
measurement have their advantages and disadvantages). Further, regression of 
productivity on backward linkage may not be able to filter other effects rather than 
technology transfer. For instance, selling to multinationals may allow suppliers to operate 
at a more efficient scale. Thus, in the future we hope to adjust these limitations and 
expand the scope of our research.    
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C h a p t e r  8  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Our research looks into various aspects of backward linkage on upstream suppliers’ 
performance, including total factor productivity and labor productivity for both the firm 
level and industry level test. Again, let us review the summary of our test results, 
Table 16. Summary of test results  
Dependant Variable Data description Test Effects of Backward 
Linkages 
All firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Domestic only pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
TFP (output regressed on 
capital, labor and material 
Foreign firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster -, significant 
All firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Domestic only pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
TFP (value added regressed 
on capital and labor 
Foreign firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster -, significant 
All firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Domestic only pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster +, significant 
Labor Productivity 
Foreign firms pooled (99-02) Robust Cluster -, significant 
Pooled -, significant 
Random -, insignificant 
TFP (value added regressed 
on capital and labor 
Industry-Level Panel  
94-03, with time dummy 
variables 
Fixed -, insignificant 
Pooled -, insignificant 
Random +, significant 
TFP (value added regressed 
on capital and labor 
Industry-Level Panel  
94-03, without time dummy 
variables 
Fixed +, significant 
Labor Productivity Industry-Level Panel  
94-03 
Pooled -, significant 
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Random -, significant   
Fixed -, insignificant 
Pooled -, significant 
Random +, significant 
Labor Productivity Industry-Level Panel  
94-03 
Fixed +, significant 
 
To test whether backward linkages bring productivity gain to local suppliers, we adopt 
Javorcik’s (2004) model to examine the effects of backward linkages from FDI on 
performance of local suppliers using industry level panel and firm level pooled dataset in 
Chinese manufacturing sectors. Both tests we perform complement each other. While the 
industry-level data constitute a balanced panel sample from 1994-2002, the firm level data 
contain more accurate information about productivity gains at the micro level. The firm 
level tests provide robust evidence of the positive effects of backward linkage on firm 
productivity in the Chinese manufacturing sectors, which are consistent with previous 
studies using the same methodology. The industry tests, on the contrary, provide little 
evidence of such effects. However, we believe this is due to lack of multiple input-output 
tables to capture the real industry structural change over time, and that’s why the test 
results are reversed when time dummy variables are eliminated.  
 
Generally speaking, our test results are consistent with previous studies by providing 
positive evidence of backward linkage on industry and firm level productivity, and such 
productivity are not limited to production technology, but also labor productivity.  Our 
study adds to the recent new empirical studies of backward linkages effects of FDI (as 
mentioned in the Introduction) and, to our knowledge, is the first attempt to examine 
such effects in China.  
 
Policy Implications 
The theoretical discussions and econometrical analysis show the strong evidence of 
technology transfer from FDI through backward linkage in the Chinese manufacturing 
sectors. Thus, it is for the government’s interests to enhance the magnitude of backward 
linkage. Before Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the effective ways to do so 
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were mainly local content requirement and contractual technology transfer requirement. 
However, upon China’s accession to the WTO, the restrictions on foreign investment in 
terms of investment fields, geographic regions, technology transfers, local content 
requirement and foreign exchange equilibrium were removed. Thus, under this new 
“game”, the government needs to come up with alternative ways to strengthen backward 
linkage with FDI. Perhaps one meaningful way is to raise multinationals’ incentives to 
purchase intermediate input locally in China after the requirement for local content were 
called to an end. Under profit maximization, multinationals will always choose the ways 
that give them the highest profit- if it is more expensive for multinationals to import 
intermediate input from overseas, they will choose to purchase raw material in host 
country. Thus, local suppliers can either reduce prices or improve quality for intermediate 
input to attract multinational clients away from imports. Both ways can be realized by self-
technology upgrading. Actually, several literatures have pointed out that backward linkage 
depends on technology sophistication of local suppliers. Moran (2001) indicates that 
multinationals have incentives to build up supply chains with local suppliers only when 
such supply chain can assist them achieve full economics of scale. Therefore, self-
upgrading is an effective way in enhancing backward linkage from FDI.  
Besides, the Chinese government may want follow Singapore’s example by setting up 
Local Industry Upgrading Program, in which the Economic Development Board 
reimbursed the salary of managers of each participating multinational investor if these 
managers would invite local companies to their quality and process training programs, and 
would help identify which of them showed promise of becoming internationally 
competitive suppliers. For example, the foreign affiliate would often recommend specific 
machinery for the local firms to buy to upgrade their own performance (Moran 2001). To 
sum, under the WTO rules, the key is to rely on foreign investors to point out promising 
suppliers and help them obtain the assistance they need to follow recommendations about 
equipment and training, without requiring the multinationals to by specific amounts of 
suppliers’ output. This approach to vendor development has appeared to be transparent. 
The formula for success has been on the part of host authorities rather than mandatory 
controls and requirements.  
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